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Articles 
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in 
Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis 
and a Proposal for Reform 
Jill E. Fisch,* Sean J. Griffith** & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon*** 
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with 
the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%.  The value of this litigation, 
however, is questionable.  The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing 
more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement.  The 
attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a 
court-awarded fee.  This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits 
only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent.  In 
response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful 
oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result are beneficial 
to shareholders. 
This Article offers a new approach to assessing the value of these claims 
by empirically testing the relationship between merger litigation and 
shareholder voting on the merger.  If the supplemental disclosures produced by 
the settlement of merger litigation are valuable, they should affect shareholder 
voting behavior.  Specifically, supplemental disclosures that are, in effect, 
“compelled” by settlement should produce new and unfavorable information 
about the merger and lead to a lower percentage of shares voted in favor of it.  
Applying this hypothesis to a hand-collected sample of 453 large public 
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company mergers from 2005 to 2012, we find no such effect.  We find no 
significant evidence that disclosure-only settlements affect shareholder voting. 
These findings warrant a reconsideration of Delaware merger law.  
Specifically, under current law, supplemental disclosures are viewed by courts 
as providing a substantial benefit to the shareholder class.  In turn, this 
substantial benefit entitles the plaintiffs’ lawyers to an award of attorneys’ fees.  
Our evidence suggests that this legal analysis is misguided and that 
supplemental disclosures do not in fact constitute a substantial benefit.  As a 
result, and in light of the substantial costs generated by public-company 
merger litigation, we argue that courts should reject disclosure settlements as a 
basis for attorneys’ fee awards. 
Our approach responds to critiques of merger litigation as excessive and 
frivolous by reducing the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring weak cases, 
but it would have an additional benefit.  Current practice drags state court 
judges into the task of indirectly promulgating disclosure standards in 
connection with the approval of fee awards.  We argue, instead, for a more 
efficient specialization between state and federal courts in the regulation of 
mergers: public company merger disclosure should be policed by the federal 
securities laws while state corporate law focuses on substantive fairness.  
 
It is a fact evident to all of those who are familiar with shareholder 
litigation that surviving a motion to dismiss means, as a practical 
matter, that economical rational defendants . . . will settle such 
claims, often for a peppercorn and a fee.1 
 
      ––Chancellor William T. Allen in Solomon v. Pathe 
 
Introduction 
Deal litigation is pervasive in the United States.  Multiple teams of 
plaintiffs file lawsuits challenging virtually every public company merger,2 
often in multiple jurisdictions.3  Moreover, the frequency of merger 
litigation has risen sharply over the last several years.4  In 2012, 93% of 
 
1. Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 21, 1995) (footnote omitted). 
2. Both our empirical analysis and the policy proposals in this Article are limited to mergers 
that involve publicly traded target companies.  We do not address the role of litigation in policing 
mergers involving private companies. 
3. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
4. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015) (reporting that although only 
39.3% of transactions incurred litigation in 2005, the frequency of litigation had risen to 92.1% by 
2011). 
FISCHETAL.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  6:24 PM 
2015] Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement 559 
deals over $100 million and 96% of deals over $500 million were 
challenged in shareholder litigation.5  In 2013, the frequency was even 
higher—97.5% of deals over $100 million were challenged through 
litigation, and each transaction triggered an average of seven separate 
lawsuits.6 
Although deal litigation is pervasive, these lawsuits rarely result in a 
monetary recovery for the plaintiff class.  Rather, the vast majority end in 
settlement or dismissal.  In most settled cases, the only relief provided to 
shareholders consists of supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy 
statement.7  In compensation for the benefit produced by these 
settlements—often worth no more, in the words of a famous jurist, than a 
“peppercorn”—plaintiffs’ attorneys receive a fee award.8 
The dynamic, in which every deal is challenged but only the lawyers 
get paid, has led to widespread skepticism concerning the value of public 
company merger litigation among both academic and professional com-
mentators.9  The view underlying much of this skepticism is that litigation 
 
5. ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 & fig.1 (2013), available at 
http://cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Mergers-and-
Acqui, archived at http://perma.cc/TRL8-QNTK?type=pdf; see also Matthew D. Cain & Steven 
M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012, at 1–2 & tbl.A  (Feb. 1, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216727, archived at http://perma.cc/X8HD-
PLHC (finding approximately 92% of deals over $100 million resulted in merger litigation in 
2012). 
6. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1–2 & tbl.A 
(Moritz Coll. of Law Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, Public Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series No. 236, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XP2B-8C8B. 
7. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 6 fig.7 (finding that shareholders received only 
supplemental disclosures in 75%–88% of settlements between 2009 to 2012); Cain & Davidoff, 
supra note 5, at 4 (finding that disclosure-only settlements accounted for over 80% of all 
settlements in 2012); Ann Woolner et al., When Merger Suits Enrich Only Lawyers, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 16, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-
investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals.html, archived at http://perma.cc/32HY-
A22M (reporting that 70% of merger lawsuits in Delaware during 2010 and 2011 made money for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys but not their clients).  The supplemental disclosure may be a part of the target 
company’s proxy statement or prospectus or, in some cases, the target’s Schedule 14D-9.  For 
brevity, we will refer to all of these collectively as the “proxy.” 
8. Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 21, 1995). 
9. See, e.g., JOEL C. HAIMS & JAMES J. BEHA, II, RECENT DECISIONS SHOW COURTS 
CLOSELY SCRUTINIZING FEE AWARDS IN M&A LITIGATION SETTLEMENTS 1 (2013) (noting that 
shareholder suits follow virtually every major merger announcement and the payment of 
attorneys’ fees has essentially become a tax on significant mergers and acquisitions), available at 
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130418-In-the-courts.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc 
/9NBW-VL2S; Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
669, 688–91 (2013) (describing four types of criticism the Chancery Court has expressed); David 
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that returns no monetary recovery to the plaintiff class must be without 
merit.10  Equating merit and monetary recovery, however, implicitly 
dismisses the value of nonpecuniary relief.  Such nonpecuniary relief may 
be valuable to shareholders, but it is hard to determine its value. 
Importantly, Delaware law explicitly recognizes the potential value of 
nonpecuniary relief in its litigation incentive structure.  Delaware courts 
award legal fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys on the basis of lawsuits that provide 
nonpecuniary relief to the plaintiff class as long as that relief constitutes a 
corporate benefit.11  Nevertheless, Delaware courts recognize that the value 
of nonpecuniary benefits is difficult to quantify.  Courts refer to the value of 
amendments and supplemental disclosures as “qualitative” and “intan-
gible,” meaning, essentially, that they cannot be measured.12  Without a 
metric for the value of nonpecuniary relief, it is difficult to determine the 
utility of the litigation and, in particular, to determine the extent to which 
courts, by awarding fees, should encourage the pursuit of litigation that 
tends to result in nonpecuniary settlements.13 
In this Article, we offer a way out of the impasse.  We propose that the 
value of nonpecuniary relief in merger settlements be measured by its effect 
on shareholder voting.  Because nonpecuniary relief takes three basic forms 
in the context of merger litigation—settlements that amend the terms of the 
merger (amendment settlements); settlements that provide only supple-
mental disclosures (disclosure-only settlements); and settlements which 
provide for an increase in the merger consideration (consideration-increase 
settlements)—we separate each and test their effect on how shareholders 
 
H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of 
Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Action, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
907, 909–10 (2014) (exploring the debate among commentators about the utility of merger 
litigation); Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits Yield High Costs and 
Questionable Benefits, DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2012, 10:38 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/merger-lawsuits-yield-high-costs-and-questionable-
benefits/, archived at http://perma.cc/8V7J-2B6Z (stating that deal litigation may “impose 
excessive costs on the companies involved and their shareholders” while delivering uncertain 
benefits). 
10. E.g., Browning Jeffries, The Plaintiffs’ Lawyer’s Transaction Tax: The New Cost of 
Doing Business in Public Company Deals, 11 BERKELEY BUS.  L.J. 55, 56–59 (2014). 
11. Delaware law provides that the court may award plaintiffs’ counsel a fee, payable by the 
corporate defendant, when the litigation produces a benefit to the corporation and its shareholders.  
Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 147 (Del. 1980). 
12. In re Sauer–Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
13. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 44, In re Gen-
Probe S’holders Litig., No. 7495-VCL (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Gen-Probe 
Transcript] (“I recognize that the policy is to encourage stockholder champions to bring 
meritorious litigation but not to confer unwholesome windfalls that result in excessive and 
unwarranted lawsuits.”). 
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vote on the deal.14  Our core hypotheses are as follows: First, because 
amendments should improve the terms of the merger or the quality of the 
procedures used in reaching a final agreement, amendment settlements 
should increase shareholder voting in favor of the merger.  In contrast, 
because forced disclosures should produce negative information about the 
merger, we hypothesize that disclosure-only settlements should decrease 
shareholder voting in favor of the merger. 
Our empirical tests draw upon a hand-collected sample of 453 mergers 
involving publicly traded target companies announced from 2005 and 
completed through 2012 along with proxy-voting statistics provided to us 
by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) over the same period.  Although 
in theory it would be best to test the effect of nonpecuniary relief by 
comparing shareholder votes before and after the settlement, such a 
comparison is not possible because shareholder votes are tallied only once, 
when the polls are closed at the meeting to approve the merger agreement.  
As a result, our tests take the form of regressions.  Our regression analyses 
compare votes cast in cases involving amendment settlements and 
disclosure-only settlements to votes in other mergers. 
Our tests yield two main empirical results.  First, we find weak support 
for our first hypothesis—that is, that amendment settlements increase 
shareholder voting in favor of a transaction.  Second, and more importantly, 
we find no support for the second hypothesis—that is, disclosure-only 
settlements do not appear to affect shareholder voting in any way.  We also 
find only weak evidence that consideration-increase settlements increase 
shareholder voting in favor of a transaction.  To gauge the significance of 
our findings, we also tested the effect of several other variables on 
shareholder voting, including transaction size and premium paid, the proxy 
advisors’ recommendation and institutional ownership, and the jurisdiction 
of settlement.  We find that transaction value and the proxy advisors’ 
recommendation have a significant effect on shareholder voting; the other 
variables do not. 
The implication of these findings is clear.  If disclosure settlements do 
not affect shareholder voting, it is difficult to argue that they benefit 
shareholders.  Accordingly, the basis upon which courts are awarding fees 
to plaintiffs’ counsel disappears.  Moreover, the illusory benefit of 
supplemental disclosure must be weighed against the clear cost of merger 
litigation—including litigation expense as well as delay and uncertainty.  
Accordingly, our Article proposes that the Delaware courts stop awarding 
fees for disclosure-only settlements.  This reform would reduce the 
 
14. Some settlements provide for a combination of relief.  We treat settlements that both 
amend the merger agreement and provide supplemental disclosures as “amendment settlements.”  
See infra note 137. 
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incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring weak merger cases.  To the extent 
that merger disclosures are meaningfully deficient, we argue that plaintiffs 
should be required to litigate challenges to disclosure quality under the 
federal securities laws.  This would have the effect of efficiently 
specializing litigation challenges while reducing plaintiffs’ counsels’ ability 
to use disclosure as a negotiating point to justify a fee award. 
We also argue that state court merger litigation has had the perverse 
effect of creating a substantive state law of disclosure that is litigated 
almost exclusively within the artificial context of settlement approval rather 
than in truly adversarial proceedings.  This state law exists within the 
shadow of federal regulation of mergers, which imposes extensive and 
explicit disclosure obligations on publicly traded companies.  We suggest 
that the duplication is unnecessary and problematic.  Specifically, federal 
law is expressly tailored to achieving an appropriate balance in disclosure 
requirements and addressing disclosure deficiencies that are substantially 
likely to influence the voting decision—that is, material misrepresentations 
or omissions.  In contrast, Delaware law creates an incentive for litigants to 
generate, and judges to reward, throwaway disclosures that are designed 
simply to end litigation and generate a release.15  These settlements produce 
disclosures that do not matter to shareholders but are instead simply “useful 
gravy.”16 
Our recommendation would restore merger litigation to the balance 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Santa Fe v. Green.17  In 
Santa Fe v. Green, the Court limited the federal securities law cause of 
action to challenges to disclosure quality, holding that challenges to the 
adequacy of the merger consideration should be litigated under state law.18  
We argue that the Delaware courts should reach a similar result—a type of 
consensual preemption—by concluding that claims about the adequacy of 
merger disclosure should be litigated under federal law and subject to the 
materiality threshold and other procedural requirements associated with 
federal litigation.  This efficient specialization would leave for state law 
issues concerning the fairness of the merger terms. 
This Article fits within the body of scholarly literature on 
representative litigation generally and shareholder litigation in particular.19  
 
15. See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger 
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1065 (2013) (describing this dynamic). 
16. Gen-Probe Transcript, supra note 13, at 27. 
17. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
18. Id. at 479–80. 
19. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications for 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669, 677 (1986) (characterizing plaintiffs’ lawyers in representative 
litigation as “private attorneys general” and theorizing that the litigation and settlement patterns 
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This literature has frequently questioned the extent to which representative 
litigation produces meaningful value for plaintiffs.20  Although many 
articles criticize merger litigation, to our knowledge none supports its 
conclusion with empirical evidence on the relationship between merger 
litigation and shareholder voting. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I we 
describe the dynamics of merger litigation and note, in particular, the role 
that courts have played in encouraging litigation challenges through the 
terms on which they approve settlements and fee awards.  Part I explicitly 
identifies the motivation for our empirical tests: the assumption that these 
settlements provide a benefit to plaintiff shareholders.  In Part II we report 
our empirical results.  Most significantly, we find that amendment 
settlements affect shareholder voting but that disclosure settlements do not.  
In Part III we consider the public policy implications of our findings.  
Part IV identifies and responds to possible objections to our proposa, and in 
Part V, we briefly sketch out possible methods for implementation.  We 
conclude that Delaware courts should abandon the practice of compensating 
plaintiffs’ lawyers for disclosure-only settlements. 
I. Merger Litigation and Disclosure-Only Settlements  
A. The Anatomy of a Merger Claim 
State court merger litigation is premised upon the traditional fiduciary 
duties that target-company officers and directors owe to the company’s 
shareholders21 in connection with an acquisition, merger, or other business 
 
will reflect their private incentives).  Much empirical work on shareholder litigation is devoted to 
securities fraud class actions.  E.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1465 (2004); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American 
Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. 
Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164 (2009). 
20. See, e.g., Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s 
Clothes of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1347–48 (2005) (describing coupon 
settlements of dubious value including one where attorneys received $1.75 million and consumers 
received a free box of Cheerios if they kept the original grocery receipt to prove purchase); 
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 
84–85 (1991) (concluding that “shareholder litigation is a weak, if not ineffective, instrument of 
corporate governance”); Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How 
Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1822, 1855–56 
(2004) (examining 104 merger class actions filed in Delaware between 1999 to 2001 and finding 
that merger litigation is lawyer driven, resulting in opportunistic filing and settlement of claims). 
21. Although the shareholders of both target and acquiring companies may be unhappy about 
a planned merger, target shareholders are the typical plaintiffs in merger litigation.  In part, this is 
because target-company shareholders can typically bring a direct action, while the acquirer’s 
shareholders can only bring a derivative suit in the name of the corporation, which is subject to a 
variety of procedural limitations.  Notably, Delaware law has imposed distinctive duties on target-
company boards in the merger context.  See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 
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combination.22  In recent years this type of claim has proliferated.23  State 
law fiduciary duties encompass several types of claims.  In friendly deals,24 
the typical claims are a breach of the duty of care and a failure to act in 
good faith, based on allegations that the board failed to work diligently to 
maximize the merger price.25  The transaction may also trigger a related 
Revlon26 claim.  Claims in the context of a controlling shareholder add more 
traditional allegations of duty-of-loyalty violations.27  Finally, shareholders 
can allege violations of the board’s state law duty of disclosure.28 
The Delaware courts developed the scope of directors’ state law 
disclosure obligations fairly recently.29  Although the courts have long 
 
637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) (requiring enhanced scrutiny in a stock transaction in which the target 
company went from being diffusely held to coming under the influence of a controlling 
shareholder); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181–84 (Del. 
1986) (proscribing enhanced scrutiny in a cash transaction involving a break up of the target 
company); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711–15 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair dealing 
and fair price in non-arm’s length transactions).  But see J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of 
Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 7 (2013) 
(criticizing the so-called “Paramount doctrine” and seeking to articulate a new basis for enhanced 
scrutiny). 
22. For the sake of brevity, we refer to all of these transactions collectively as “mergers.” 
23. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
24. Our analysis does not focus on hostile litigation, which raises independent bases for 
litigation.  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–54 (Del. 1985) 
(articulating the legal principles applicable in a challenge to a board’s adoption of defensive 
measures initiated in response to a takeover attempt). 
25. See, e.g., Robert Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 143, 145–47 (2004). 
26. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
27. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 25, at 196. 
28. A target board has a disclosure obligation under Delaware law that stems both from the 
statute and from the board’s fiduciary duty.  See In re Primedia, Inc. S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 
455, 495 (Del. Ch. 2013) (distinguishing “the statutory obligation to maintain a current and candid 
merger recommendation . . . and the fiduciary duty to disclose material information when seeking 
stockholder action”).  The statutory duty to disclose in connection with merger transactions arises 
from the requirement that the board make a recommendation concerning the advisability of an 
intended merger transaction to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon.  See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 251(b) (2011) (requiring that the board adopt the agreement and declare its advisability 
prior to the shareholder vote).  See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch 
Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1163 (1996) 
(describing the fiduciary duty of disclosure as “an obligation to use reasonable care in presenting a 
recommendation for stockholder action and in gathering and disseminating corporate information 
in connection with that recommendation”).  Because shareholders cannot act without information, 
courts have interpreted the statute to require that the board “disclose fully and fairly all material 
information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.”  Stroud v. Grace, 606 
A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). 
29. It is likely that the source is the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stroud v. Grace.  
See Hamermesh, supra note 28, at 1089–91 (describing the development of the duty of disclosure 
under Delaware corporation law following Stroud).  Seeds of a broader disclosure duty under 
Delaware law appear much earlier.  For example, Elliott Weiss and Lawrence White characterize 
the Court’s decision in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977), as moving 
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recognized that the board in a merger is responsible for providing 
shareholders with sufficient information to approve or reject the transaction 
on an informed basis,30 the suggestion that directors have an independent 
duty of disclosure and that directors can breach that duty by failing to 
provide shareholders with information material to the vote is of recent 
vintage.31 
Plaintiffs in merger litigation typically ask for equitable relief—most 
often in the form of an injunction barring consummation of the transaction 
or requiring a substantial revision of its terms, such as a higher price.32  The 
suits are filed during the pendency of the transaction—usually within days 
of the public announcement of the merger.33  Most of the litigation effort, 
motions practice, and expedited discovery takes place during the relatively 
brief window between the merger filing and its closing.34  Because claims 
that are not resolved on motions or settled prior to closing can theoretically 
be litigated long after closing, creating a potentially significant contingent 
liability, defendants have a strong incentive to resolve merger claims before 
 
“Delaware law from a posture of requiring less disclosure than federal law requires to a posture of 
requiring more.”  Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A 
Study of Investors’ Reactions to “Changes” in Corporate Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 551, 572 
(1987). 
30. The seminal case for this proposition is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), 
which held that a board had breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose the parameters of the 
negotiations leading to the company’s sale.  Id. at 890–92. 
31. Delaware’s focus on disclosure can be traced to a series of recent cases that required 
enhanced disclosure in investment banker fairness analysis, as well as in private equity and other 
conflicted interest transactions.  See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 
449–50 (Del. Ch. 2002) (requiring that a target disclose in a tender offer the underlying 
information used in preparation of a fairness opinion received by its board).  See generally 
Lloyd L. Drury, III, Private Equity and the Heightened Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure, 6 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 33, 45–48 (2009) (discussing the heightened duty of disclosure employed in Delaware 
private equity cases in recent years); Blake Rohrbacher & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, Fair 
Summary: Delaware’s Framework for Disclosing Fairness Opinions, 63 BUS. LAW. 881 (2008) 
(explaining the duty of disclosure in Delaware law in general and specifically addressing how the 
duty affects fairness opinions). 
32. See, e.g., Verified Amended Class Action Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at 27, 
Schacher v. Clausen, No. 8396-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Sauer–Danfoss 
Complaint] (seeking to have the proposed merger permanently enjoined). 
33. See, e.g., In re Sauer–Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1119 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(noting that plaintiffs filed their complaint challenging the merger “hours after” the merger plan 
was announced); DAINES & KOUMRAIN, supra note 5, at 1 (explaining that, for lawsuits filed in 
2012, “[t]hese lawsuits were filed an average of 14 days after the merger announcement, with 
plaintiff firms sometimes announcing investigations within hours of the merger announcement”). 
34. WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP, 2013 M&A REPORT 17 (2013), 
available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Edito 
rial/Publication/2013-wilmerhale-ma-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EN4X-4DGK 
(“Discovery in these cases can be very fast paced and compressed, since plaintiffs will seek 
expedited discovery before the shareholder vote on the transaction.”). 
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the merger closes.35  Empirical studies confirm these incentives, finding that 
nearly 70% of merger claims settle while the rest are dismissed.36  The vast 
majority of the settlements are concluded prior to the closing of the 
underlying transaction.37 
Although the complaints in merger cases typically allege that the 
merger is substantively unfair,38 few cases result in any monetary recovery 
for the plaintiff class.39  Some suits result in amendments to the merger 
agreement, often to the transaction’s deal-protection provisions.40  The vast 
majority of suits, however, settle exclusively for supplemental disclosure in 
the form of additional information in the merger proxy statement.41  The 
specific disclosures can vary—they may include details of the negotiating 
process, the manner in which the investment bankers are being 
compensated in connection with the deal, or specifics about the manner in 
which the deal or the target company has been valued, either by the board 
or its advisers.42  The supplemental disclosures are provided in an amended 
proxy statement (Schedule 14A) and are generally disclosed in an 8-K 
report as well.43  Commentators typically refer to such settlements, when 
 
35. For an example of a merger case that resulted in a $1.347 billion damage award six years 
after the deal closed, see In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 766, 
819 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
36. E.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 477. 
37. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 9 (2012) [hereinafter RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION]. 
38. See, e.g., Sauer–Danfoss Complaint, supra note 32, at para. 76, at 24 (alleging that, as a 
result of defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs “have not and will not receive their fair 
portion of the value of Sauer–Danfoss’s assets and will be deprived of a fair process”). 
39. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 6 fig.7.  In a small number of cases, however, 
merger litigation can result in substantial damage awards.  For example, in 2012, two cases were 
settled for large money damages—$110 million in the deal between El Paso and Kinder Morgan 
and $49 million in the acquisition of Delphi Financial Group, Inc. by Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc.  
Id. at 6. 
40. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1093 (“A small number of settlements 
(approximately thirteen percent) resulted in changes to the merger agreement, most often to the 
deal-protection provisions . . . .”).  Nondisclosure settlements declined to only 12.5% of 
settlements in 2012.  Cain & Davidoff, supra note 5, at 4.   
41. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 6 (observing that in 81% of merger cases filed 
in 2012, the only product of the settlement was additional disclosure); Cain & Davidoff, supra 
note 4, at 478 (“Settlements which only require disclosure constitute 55.1% of the settlement types 
in the sample and are the most common type of settlement.”). 
42. See infra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
43. See, e.g., Zygo Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 6, 2014), available at 
http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfilinginfo.aspx?filingid=10039268&tabindex=2&ty 
pe=html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y8DT-DQU9 (disclosing additional information in 
conjunction with settlement of merger lawsuit). 
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they are not combined with some other form of relief, as “disclosure-only” 
settlements,44 a terminology that we will employ in this Article. 
The practical explanation for disclosure-only settlements lies in the 
financial structure of U.S. shareholder litigation.  Although parties to 
litigation normally must finance their own costs, shareholder suits—both 
derivative suits and class actions—operate under a long-recognized 
exception to this so-called “American Rule.”45  Instead the courts have 
determined that plaintiffs’ lawyers in shareholder litigation can have their 
fees paid directly by the defendant corporation if the litigation results in a 
“corporate benefit.”46  The key to plaintiffs’ counsel recovering fees is the 
portrayal of the settlement relief as a corporate benefit.47  In a negotiated 
settlement, defendants will typically not oppose this characterization, nor 
will they oppose the sought-after fee award, an important element of the 
bargain.48 
Average fee awards for the settlement of merger litigation vary widely.  
In Del Monte,49 plaintiffs’ counsel received one of the largest fee awards—
$22.3 million for a case that generated a recovery to the plaintiff of $89.4 
million.50  At the low end of the scale is the recent award of $100,000 in 
Gen-Probe.51  Given this wide range, reports of average fee awards can 
easily be misleading.  Because most cases settle for disclosure only, 
however, focusing on disclosure settlements may provide a more realistic 
view of the incentives under which most plaintiffs’ attorneys are operating.  
 
44. E.g., Sumpter, supra note 9, at 678. 
45. In re Dunkin’ Donuts S’holders Litig., No. 10825, 1990 WL 189120, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 27, 1990). 
46. Id.; see also infra subpart I(C). 
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  The corporate benefit doctrine is actually a 
variant of earlier collective decisions awarding attorneys’ fees out of a common fund in cases in 
which the litigation produced a common fund for the benefit of the corporation or plaintiff class.  
Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the 
Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 37–41 (2015).  
48. See In re Sauer–Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1137 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(“‘[O]nce a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms with their 
former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork.’” (quoting Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 
327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Griffith & 
Lahav, supra note 15, at 1093 (“The approval process that courts follow in determining fees 
awarded to class counsel is, in an important sense, nonadversarial.”); Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: 
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991) 
(describing settlement hearings as “pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and 
defense counsel”). 
49. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
50. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 57–58, Del Monte Foods, 25 A.3d 813 (No. 6027–
VCL) [hereinafter Del Monte Transcript]. 
51. In re Gen-Probe Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 7495-VCL, 2013 WL 1465619, at para. 9 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 10, 2013). 
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In disclosure-only settlements, the average requested fee award has declined 
over the past several years, from an average of $730,000 in 2009 to an 
average of $540,000 in 2012.52  Studies show that the average fee awarded 
in disclosure-only settlements is approximately $500,000.53  
B. Approving Settlement 
Because of the representative nature of merger litigation, the 
termination of a merger suit by voluntary dismissal or settlement requires 
court approval.54  For most cases that are settled, the court’s role at a 
settlement hearing is threefold: the court must approve the certification of 
the class;55 the court must assess whether the settlement is fair and 
reasonable;56 and the court must decide on the amount of the fee to be 
awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel.57  While these steps are independent in 
theory, as a practical matter, they often collapse.  If the court determines 
that the benefits provided by a settlement are illusory, the plaintiff class will 
not have received any consideration for the releases that accompany a 
settlement, and the settlement will not be seen as fair.58  In such a case, the 
court might properly refuse to approve the settlement.  This decision might, 
however, raise questions about the adequacy with which the class has been 
represented, suggesting that the court should deny class certification.59  
Similarly, if the court approves the settlement, it has implicitly concluded 
that the plaintiff class has received something of value, making it difficult 
to decline to award a fee to class counsel.  Notably, the judges in the 
Delaware Chancery Court are conscious of the incentives that their 
decisions create with respect to future litigation.60  As a result, their 
 
52. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 9 fig.9. 
53. See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 6, at 4 tbl.B (reporting the mean and median 
attorneys’ fees for disclosure-only settlements in 2013 as $511,000 and $485,000, respectively). 
54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval for dismissal or compromise of a 
class action); accord DEL. CT. CH. R. 23(e). 
55. At certification, the judge is charged with determining that the class meets the 
requirements of the class action rule, including adequacy of representation and of class counsel.  
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618–20 (1997); see also In re Revlon, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 957 (Del. Ch. 2010) (finding counsel was inadequate and therefore 
declining to approve settlement). 
56. In re Triarc Cos., 791 A.2d 872, 876 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
57. In re Sauer–Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1135 (Del. Ch. 2011); see also 
infra subpart I(C). 
58. The settlement agreement typically requires the plaintiffs to release all claims arising out 
of the merger.  Note how this precludes all related claims as a result of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.  Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1058. 
59. E.g., Transcript of Teleconference at 10–11, In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders 
Litig., No. 6574-CS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Transatlantic Holdings Transcript]. 
60. See, e.g., Sauer–Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1136 (recognizing that consistency among opinions 
promotes fairness by establishing baseline expectations). 
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opinions frequently seek to benchmark their judgments about settlement 
value and an appropriate fee level by reference to comparable cases.61 
In determining whether a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable, 
the court attempts to weigh the consideration received by the plaintiff class 
against the strength of the claims that are being released as part of the 
settlement.  As Chancellor Allen explained in Caremark,62 a motion seeking 
judicial approval of a proposed settlement “requires the court to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of the claims asserted in light of the discovery 
record and to evaluate the fairness and adequacy of the consideration 
offered . . . in exchange for the release of all claims made or arising from 
the facts alleged.”63  This is more easily said than done. 
The courts’ task in reviewing and approving settlements is complicated 
by three factors.  First, the settlement hearing is likely to be nonadversarial 
in nature.  Second, the factual record presented to the court will be 
relatively undeveloped.  Third, in the absence of an intervening bid, the 
intended transaction will likely be highly beneficial to shareholders, causing 
the judge to hesitate to throw additional obstacles in its path.  With regard 
to the nonadversarial nature of the hearing, both plaintiffs and defendants 
will have a strong incentive to have their agreed-upon settlement approved 
by the court.  Hence, in the absence of objectors, information indicating that 
the settlement is unfair or unreasonable will not be brought to the court’s 
attention.  Second, at a settlement hearing, the court is reviewing a 
stipulated statement of facts rather than hearing trial testimony or reviewing 
other direct evidence.  Counsel’s development of the factual record through 
discovery may be limited both because of the short window within which 
merger litigation is conducted and because, once a settlement appears 
likely, neither side wishes to expend unnecessary resources on additional 
fact-finding.64  As a result, even without the potential for collusion inherent 
in a nonadversarial proceeding, the court is likely to lack all information 
necessary to evaluate the settlement.  Moreover, the counterfactual analysis 
required to evaluate the strength of plaintiffs’ claims is generally 
impractical.  Third and finally, the court is in a difficult position since 
experience shows that the vast majority of proposed mergers are approved 
by shareholders, usually by an overwhelming vote, due to the premium 
mergers provide shareholders over the current market price.  Without an 
 
61. See, e.g., id. (determining an appropriate fee award by comparing past fee awards granted 
by the court in similar cases). 
62. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del Ch. 1996). 
63. Id. at 961. 
64. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945–46 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(describing a “kabuki dance” of deal litigation in which “real litigation activity . . . ceased” once 
the litigation leadership structure is established). 
FISCHETAL.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  6:24 PM 
570 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:557 
intervening bidder, the court is unlikely to throw additional obstacles in the 
way of a transaction that offers plain benefits to shareholders.65  As a result, 
there is good reason to doubt the ability even of expert jurists to assess the 
fairness and adequacy of settlements reliably in this context. 
Despite these limitations, Delaware judges take seriously their 
obligation to safeguard the interests of the class by reviewing settlement 
quality.  Evaluating a settlement that provides increased consideration or 
damages to the plaintiffs is relatively straightforward.  Amendment 
settlements may benefit the shareholders by increasing the likelihood that a 
third party will make a topping bid.  Thus, in Compellent,66 Vice Chanceller 
J. Travis Laster explained that the value of therapeutic changes to a merger 
agreement “can be estimated as a function of the incremental amount that 
stockholders would receive if a higher bid emerged times the probability of 
the higher bid.”67  The court went on to consider empirical data in order to 
quantify the potential frequency and size of a topping bid.68 
Disclosure-only settlements can benefit the shareholder class if the 
required disclosures allow the shareholders to exercise their voting rights in 
a more meaningful manner.  In Sauer–Danfoss,69 for example, Vice 
Chancellor Laster evaluated the eleven supplemental disclosures called for 
by the settlement agreement and weighed the extent to which each provided 
meaningful new information to shareholders.70  He concluded that, of the 
eleven, only one was material.71  Similarly in PAETEC,72 Vice Chancellor 
Sam Glasscock considered each individual disclosure required by the 
proposed settlement and concluded that, except for one, each was of 
doubtful materiality, trivial, or of marginal utility to shareholders.73 
To the extent that a court finds a proposed settlement to be of dubious 
value or, more problematically, inconsistent with its own assessment of the 
strength of the case,74 the court may view the settlement as the product of 
 
65. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 449–51 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(noting the court’s reluctance to enjoin merger, despite finding of unfair practices, where an 
injunction might deprive the shareholders of an attractive opportunity to sell their stock). 
66. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6084–VCL, 2011 WL 6382523 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 9, 2011).  
67. Id. at *20. 
68. Id. at *21–25. 
69. In re Sauer–Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
70. Id. at 1128–35. 
71. Id. at 1128. 
72. In re PAETEC Holding Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 6761–VCG, 2013 WL 1110811 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 19, 2013). 
73. Id. at *6–8. 
74. This determination might be assisted through the participation of objectors to the 
settlement.  See, e.g., Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915, 926 (Del. 1994) (remanding settlement 
for more rigorous inquiry into inadequacy of representation based on objectors’ appeal); Griffith 
 
FISCHETAL.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  6:24 PM 
2015] Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement 571 
collusion between plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel.75  In Scully v. 
Nighthawk,76 Vice Chancellor Laster appointed special counsel to inquire 
into the possibility of collusion when the litigants concluded a disclosure-
only settlement in an alternative forum77 after the Vice Chancellor in an 
earlier hearing had found no colorable disclosure claim but a potentially 
serious process issue.78  The special counsel’s brief defined the issue 
narrowly,79 ultimately concluding that collusion had not in fact occurred 
because the Nighthawk settlement was broadly comparable to other cases.80 
Although not framing his analysis in terms of collusion, Chancellor 
Leo Strine expressed similar concerns in Transatlantic Holdings.81  Having 
been asked to certify the plaintiffs’ class, approve the settlement, and award 
 
& Lahav, supra note 15, at 1084–86 (emphasizing the role of objectors in reinvigorating “the 
adversarial process in an otherwise collusive environment”).  The objection rate in class action 
settlements is low, however.  Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and 
Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 
1533–34 (2004); Jeffries, supra note 10, at 59. 
75. The principal factors identified by commentators in identifying collusive settlement 
practices—fees awarded on top of a settlement that involves limited bargaining and nonpecuniary 
relief—are present in the settlement of virtually every merger claim.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 
191–92 (2009) (listing “yellow flags” for collusion, including “settlement bargaining limited to 
one of the competing groups of plaintiffs’ attorneys; settlement with the group of attorneys who 
present a less substantial threat of carrying the case forward to trial . . . [and] the award of 
lucrative and potentially justified attorneys’ fees”). 
76. Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. dismissed 
Dec. 8, 2011). 
77. Scully, No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2010). 
78. Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at 5–6, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology 
Holdings, Inc., No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 2011). 
79. Brief of Special Counsel at 26–27, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., No. 
5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011).  The special counsel summarized the issue as follows: 
[A] collusive settlement in the context of stockholder deal litigation appears to 
involve, at its core, an explicit or implicit agreement between counsel for plaintiffs 
and counsel for defendants to require less consideration for the settling class in 
exchange for (1) exclusive dealings with particular plaintiffs’ counsel and/or (2) more 
consideration for plaintiffs’ counsel.  Factors that should give rise to heightened 
scrutiny for collusiveness include the following: settlement consideration 
disproportionately weak in comparison to the strength of the claims asserted; 
settlement with a plaintiff’s firm that typically does not litigate aggressively when 
other, more formidable, firms are involved in the litigation; and an agreement to pay 
attorneys’ fees significantly higher than are typical given the settlement 
consideration. 
Id. 
80. Id. at 28–29. 
81. Transatlantic Holdings Transcript, supra note 59, at 5–6.  The ruling—treating class 
certification, settlement approval, and the fee award together—is an example of how courts may 
collapse the analysis of settlement approval, corporate benefit, and the ultimate fee award.  See 
supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
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a fee, the Chancellor refused to do all three.82  In that case, the two class 
representatives that had been put forward, one of whom held only two 
shares, either did not vote on the transaction or did not recall how he had 
voted.83  Class counsel did not perform “any real investigation.”84  The 
disclosures amounted merely to additional background information,85 and 
the vote was 99.85% in favor of the deal with 93% of the total electorate 
casting votes.86  On the basis of these facts, the court concluded that the 
plaintiffs had “achieved nothing substantial for the class,” and therefore the 
proposed settlement did not justify releasing the claims of absent parties.87 
Current settlement practices raise a broader concern.  As noted earlier, 
upwards of 90% of mergers in recent years faced litigation challenges.88  Of 
the lawsuits filed, 71.6% settled and nearly 77% of the settlements were 
disclosure-only settlements.89  In short, plaintiffs negotiate, and courts 
approve, corrective disclosure in more than 60% of all transactions.90  It is 
implausible to think that 60% of all mergers (or 80% in the last several 
years) with public company targets and a transaction value of more than 
$100 million, deals that are staffed by top quality lawyers and investment 
bankers, involve materially deficient disclosures.  It is far more likely that 
merger lawsuits are not filed to correct disclosure problems.  The structure 
of disclosure-only settlements is likely about something else—justification 
of a fee award to plaintiffs’ counsel. 
C. The Fee Award 
Once the court has approved the settlement, it must independently 
consider the fee award.  “[A] litigant who confers a common . . . benefit 
upon an ascertainable stockholder class is entitled to an award of counsel 
fees and expenses for its efforts in creating the benefit.”91  The Delaware 
courts have repeatedly explained that the court has an independent 
obligation to determine an appropriate fee award, even in a case in which 
the defendant has agreed not to oppose the plaintiffs’ fee request.  As the 
court explained in PAETEC: “This Court has unambiguously held that‘In 
both [contested and uncontested fee applications], the Court has an 
 
82. Transatlantic Holdings Transcript, supra note 59, at 5. 
83. Id. at 5–6. 
84. Id. at 8. 
85. Id. at 7–8. 
86. Id. at 10–11. 
87. Id. at 10. 
88. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
89. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 478 tbl.III. 
90. See id. (showing that 385 of 574 litigation cases resulted in corrective disclosure). 
91. United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. Takecare, Inc., 693 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Del. 1997). 
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independent duty to award a fair and reasonable fee.”92  The court’s 
determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee is based on consideration 
of the Sugarland93 factors: 
(i) the amount of time and effort applied to the case by counsel for 
the plaintiffs; (ii) the relative complexities of the litigation; (iii) the 
standing and ability of petitioning counsel; (iv) the contingent nature 
of the litigation; (v) the stage at which the litigation ended; 
(vi) whether the plaintiff can rightly receive all the credit for the 
benefit conferred or only a portion thereof; and (vii) the size of the 
benefit conferred.94 
“Among these factors, the last two receive the greatest weight.”95  
Thus, although judicial analysis of the fee award frequently includes a 
discussion of hours expended, the quality of plaintiffs’ counsel, and the 
complexity of the case, the key consideration is typically the size of the 
benefit conferred.  Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court has 
repeatedly noted that, where the benefit provided by the litigation is 
quantifiable, “Sugarland calls for an award of attorneys’ fees based upon a 
percentage of the benefit.”96 
The determination of corporate benefit in the context of a fee award is 
obviously closely related to the assessment of settlement quality described 
above.  Specifically, enhanced disclosure has long been recognized as a 
potential benefit.97  Because of the prevalence of disclosure settlements, the 
Delaware courts have had frequent occasion to consider the circumstances 
under which such a settlement justifies a fee award and the relationship 
between the quality of the disclosures and the size of the reward.  As the 
Court noted in Sauer–Danfoss: “All supplemental disclosures are not 
equal.”98  The courts have sought to achieve relative parity across cases, 
observing that “[s]imilar disclosures merit similar fee awards.”99  In 
 
92. In re PAETEC Holding Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 6761–VCG, 2013 WL 1110811, at *5 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Sauer–Danfoss Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1137 (Del. Ch. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
93. Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980). 
94. In re Plains Res. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 071-N, 2005 WL 332811, at *3 (Del. 
Ch. Feb. 4, 2005) (citing Sugarland, 420 A.2d at 149–50). 
95. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6304–VCP, 2012 WL 1020471, at *30 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 23, 2012); accord In re Anderson Clayton S’holders’ Litig., no. 8387, 1988 WL 97480, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1988) (“[T]his court has traditionally placed greatest weight upon the benefits 
achieved by the litigation.”). 
96. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1259 (Del. 2012). 
97. See, e.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Del. 1989) (“A 
heightened level of corporate disclosure, if attributable to the filing of a meritorious suit, may 
justify an award of counsel fees.”). 
98. In re Sauer–Danfos Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
99. Id. 
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addition, the courts have expressly acknowledged the incentive effect of fee 
decisions on future litigation and stated that fee awards should encourage 
counsel to bring meritorious cases.100 
Recent Delaware decisions display an increasing tendency to apply a 
common heuristic for awarding fees in disclosure-only cases.  The court 
starts with a fee range based on precedent for the quantity and quality of 
disclosures provided.101  A threshold requirement is that the supplemental 
disclosure be material.102  One or two “meaningful” disclosures sets a 
baseline for the fee range.103  Lower quality (less valuable) disclosures 
result in a downward departure from this benchmark and “particularly 
significant or exceptional disclosures” are entitled to more.104  The fee may 
then be adjusted further based upon the other Sugarland factors.105 
The question of what types of disclosures are “meaningful” is a critical 
aspect of the courts’ analysis.  Meaningful disclosures will be rewarded 
(incentivized) with more generous fee awards.  Trivial or unhelpful 
disclosures will be compensated less generously or, in the extreme case, 
may lead to disapproval of the settlement or denial of any fee award.  In his 
opinion in Sauer–Danfoss, Vice-Chancellor Laster provided three 
appendices summarizing prior settlements and fee awards in the normal, 
low, and high fee ranges.106  A review of these appendices demonstrates 
that most meaningful disclosures, for purposes of the courts’ analysis, tend 
to focus on “previously withheld projections or undisclosed conflicts faced 
by fiduciaries or their advisors.”107  Significantly, the Delaware courts have 
stressed the importance of information regarding the investment banks’ 
 
100. E.g., Dias v. Purches, No. 7199VCG, 2012 WL 4503174, at *4 & n.29 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 
2012).  The Delaware courts’ concern that fee awards provide appropriate incentives, including 
strong incentives in meritorious cases, is not confined to merger litigation.  See, e.g., Ams. Mining 
Corp., 51 A.3d at 1252 (approving Chancery Court’s award of $300 million fee on the ground that 
it “‘creates a healthy incentive for plaintiff’s lawyers to actually seek real achievement for the 
companies that they represent in derivative actions and the classes that they represent in class 
actions’” (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiff’s Petition for Award of Attorneys’ 
Fees and Expenses and Rulings of the Court at 85, In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative 
Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011) (No. 961-CS)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
101. See, e.g., Sauer–Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1136–38 (using three similar cases to arrive at a 
base range of $75,000 to $80,000). 
102. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6304–VCP, 2012 WL 1020471, at *32 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 23, 2012); see also In re PAETEC Holding Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 6761–VCG, 2013 
WL 1110811, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013) (commencing fee analysis by determining that, 
because the package of settlement disclosures contained at least one material disclosure, the 
settlement was fee eligible). 
103. Sauer–Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1136. 
104. Id. at 1136–37. 
105. Id. at 1135–36. 
106. Id. at apps. A, B & C. 
107. Id. at 1136. 
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compensation and potential conflicts.108  As Vice Chancellor Glasscock 
recently explained: “The materiality of a disclosure of a conflicted financial 
advisor does not necessarily depend on whether the conflict actually harmed 
the sales process.”109  Less meaningful disclosures, by contrast, include 
minor corrections or disclosure of further details concerning, for example, 
discount rates, negotiation process, and valuation opinions.110 
D. A Framework for Measuring the Value of Nonpecuniary Relief 
As we have summarized, virtually every merger currently faces a 
litigation challenge.  The vast majority of cases settle, but monetary 
recoveries for shareholder plaintiffs are rare.  Courts attempt to evaluate the 
benefit produced by the proposed settlements and to compensate counsel on 
the basis of that benefit, but the procedural disadvantages that they face in 
the process render their judgments highly suspect, especially in the context 
of disclosure-only settlements.  The Delaware courts seem to share this 
skepticism, given their own oft-repeated characterization of supplemental 
disclosures as being of marginal utility at best. 
We therefore suggest an alternative way of testing the value of 
supplemental disclosures.  Because the purpose of merger disclosure is to 
inform shareholder voting, it is reasonable to view supplemental disclosure 
as meaningful if it changes the way reasonable shareholders vote.111  
Furthermore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that merger litigation is only 
effective if it produces the disclosure of new negative information about the 
merger.  This is because the defendant corporation, without the prod of 
shareholder litigation, already has an incentive to disclose positive 
information in order to win approval of the transaction and minimize 
dissent.112  However, the transacting parties might prefer to conceal 
negative information to reduce the risk that shareholders will refuse to 
approve the transaction.  Putting these two insights together, it seems clear 
 
108. See, e.g., David P. Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis, No. 3694–VCN, 2008 WL 
5048692, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) (“[I]t is imperative for the stockholders to be able to 
understand what factors might influence the financial advisor’s analytical efforts.”). 
109. In re PAETEC Holding Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 6761–VCG, 2013 WL 1110811, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013). 
110. Sauer–Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1143 app. B. 
111. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976) (“An omitted fact 
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important in deciding how to vote.”); Transatlantic Holdings Transcript, supra note 59, at 4 
(stating that the real question in evaluating a disclosure settlement is whether the supplemental 
disclosures are “in any meaningful way of utility to someone voting on the merger”). 
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (explaining that, without disclosure, “[i]nvestors 
would assume the worst, because, they would reason that if the firm had anything good to say for 
itself it would do so”). 
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that for supplemental disclosures to be meaningful, they must have a 
negative impact on shareholder voting in favor of the merger.  This leads to 
a testable hypothesis: disclosure-only settlements should reduce shareholder 
votes in favor of the deal. 
Amendment settlements are different.  The principal benefit of an 
amendment is its potential to increase the value of the merger.  An 
amendment that increases the merger price is of obvious value to 
shareholders without regard to its effect on the vote.  Most amendment 
settlements do not increase the merger consideration but instead alter an 
agreement’s deal-protection provisions, perhaps reducing a termination fee 
or increasing a go-shop period.113  The value of these amendments is in 
their potential to increase the chance of a subsequent higher bid.114  
Concededly, amendment settlements rarely lead to higher bid prices.115  
Nevertheless, reducing deal protections arguably improves the quality of 
the market check.  As a result, even when amendments do not result in a 
higher bid, they arguably should increase shareholder confidence in the 
economics of the deal.  Our second core hypothesis then is that merger 
litigation resulting in an amendment settlement should increase shareholder 
support for the merger. 
In the Part that follows, we identify and test our core hypotheses.  We 
also test a number of ancillary hypotheses relating to shareholder voting.  
High-premium deals, for example, should lead to more favorable votes than 
low-premium deals.  Deals recommended by proxy advisory firms ought to 
result in more favorable votes than deals for which those firms recommend 
a vote against the transaction.  Additionally, building upon the discussion 
above, we hypothesize that attorneys’ fees are an ex post facto assessment 
of merits in merger litigation and thus that, at least in disclosure cases, for 
the reasons articulated above, higher fees should correspond to fewer votes 
in favor of the merger. 
 
113. On deal protections generally, see Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up 
Creep, 38 J. CORP. L.  681 (2013). 
114. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6084–VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011). 
115. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 5, at 6 & fig.7 (explaining that the parties in only 
1 of 119 settling lawsuits in 2012 acknowledged that the settlement contributed to an increase in 
the merger price).  In any event, we would lose what overbids would occur from our dataset as a 
result of the research design described below.  See infra subpart II(A). 
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II. Empirical Analysis of Merger Settlements and Shareholder Voting 
A. Our Sample Set 
Our sample contains all of the transactions listed in the FactSet 
MergerMetrics116 database and announced from 2005 through 2012 that 
meet the following criteria: (1) the target is a U.S. firm publicly traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ; 
(2) the transaction size is at least $100 million; (3) the offer price is at least 
$5 per share; (4) a merger agreement is signed and publicly disclosed 
through a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and 
(5) the transaction has been completed as of the end of 2012.  Information 
on transactions and litigation is drawn from the dataset used in a prior piece 
by one of the coauthors.117 
For shareholder voting outcomes and meeting dates we obtain 
information from the Factset Proxy Data service.  We supplement this with 
information provided by ISS and by hand review of public filings.  We also 
search press wire services and news databases.  ISS recommendations are 
obtained from ISS itself.  We then merge in institutional ownership data 
from the Thomson Reuters database and stock price information from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.  We also search by 
hand in the Bloomberg Law database to determine if appraisal rights were 
exercised for Delaware incorporated targets.  We drop duplicate variables 
and variables for which we have no voting results information.  A 
substantial number of transactions do not report any voting results even 
though such a reporting is required under the securities laws.118  We arrive 
at a sample size of 453 deal observations. 
 
116. More information about the database can be found at FACTSET MERGERS (2014), 
https://www.mergermetrics.com, archived at http://perma.cc/7U34-82CR. 
117. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 486–87. 
118. Effective as of February 28, 2010 the SEC changed its disclosure rules to require that the 
outcome of shareholder votes be reported on a Form 8-K filed within four business days after the 
end of the meeting at which the vote occurred.  Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 
68,334, 68,335 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274). 
 Previously, these results were only required to be disclosed on the issuer’s next-filed Form 10-
Q or Form 10-K.  Id. at 68,349.  However, a takeover is often completed and the issuer’s shares 
deregistered before this four-business-day period has elapsed.  In those circumstances a Form 8-K 
filing is not required.  Id.  This was true even before the rule revisions when a 10-Q or 10-K could 
be due weeks or months after the acquisition’s completion.  Even when the acquisition occurs 
more than four business days after the shareholders’ meeting, issuers sometimes appear to ignore 
the filing requirements and do not report results.  The result is that of our sample size of 822 
merged transactions, we have voting data for approximately half—453.  We were unable to find 
reported voting results for the remaining issuers.  We thank Jennifer Shotwell of Innisfree for 
explaining why we could not find voting results for so many mergers in our sample.  In addition, 
we excluded transactions where the reported results were approximate rather than exact. 
FISCHETAL.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  6:24 PM 
578 Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:557 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Set forth in Table I(A) are statistics on the number of transactions in 
our sample set, the value of these transactions, and transaction offer premia. 
 
Table I(A) Transaction Values and 
Premiums ($$MM)       
  N Mean 
Std 
Dev 25th % Median 75th % 
Transaction Value ($mm) 453 $3,119 $6,902 $328 $957 $3,065 
Enterprise Value ($mm) 453 $4,272 $9,827 $399 $1,245 $3,697 
Initial Premium 453 32.73% 34.03% 14.86% 26.45% 41.30% 
Final Premium 453 33.37% 34.47% 15.17% 26.97% 41.95% 
 
Median transaction value across our sample size is $957 million.  
Mean transaction size is a significantly higher $3.119 billion, showing that 
the sample is right skewed with a standard deviation for transaction value of 
$6.902 billion.  The median initial offer premium as calculated thirty days 
prior to announcement of the transaction is 26.45%.  Final offer premium is 
calculated identically and is a slightly higher 26.97% showing that there is 
some increase in offer premium over announced and completed 
transactions.  These statistics are comparable to prior studies which have 
found a similar range of size and premiums for transactions.119 
 
Panel I(B) sets forth characteristics of the transactions in our sample. 
 
Panel I(B): Transaction Characteristics 
N % All Transactions 
Total # Transactions 453 100% 
Merger Consideration = Cash 303 66.89% 
Auction 187 41.28% 
Go Shop 58 12.80% 
Going Private 22 4.86% 
Management Buy Out 14 3.09% 
 
We focus here on transaction characteristics which may affect 
premium and shareholder voting.  303 or 66.89% of transactions were all 
 
119. See, e.g., Leonce L. Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared 
to Public Acquirers?, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 375, 376 (2008) (stating that the average premium for 
private-equity-firm acquisitions is 28.5%). 
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cash consideration, meaning that shareholders were losing a stake in the 
future combined entity.  187 or 41.28% transactions involved companies 
being sold by auction as opposed to a single-bidder negotiation.  Auction 
transactions may be less prone to shareholder objection and therefore 
receive higher votes because the target company has been more fully 
shopped to a wider array of possible bidders.  12.80% of transactions 
contained a go shop, a provision for a target to solicit bidders after 
announcement of a merger agreement.  These are largely private equity 
transactions, which themselves comprise 15.89% of the sample.  Conflicted 
transactions involving management or a controlling shareholder were a 
smaller part of the sample.  Going private transactions comprise 4.86% of 
transactions and management buy outs comprise 3.09% of transactions.  
Because of the potential these transactions present for self-dealing, it may 
be that shareholder support levels are lower. 
Table I(C) examines litigation rates for our sample. 
 
Table I(C): Litigation      
  N 
% of Total 
Litigation 
Litigation 319 100.00% 
   Settled 221   69.28% 
   Dismissed  65   20.38% 
   Multi-State 133   41.69% 
   Delaware Filing 142   44.51% 
   Delaware Settlement  67   21.00% 
 
Litigation is brought in an average of 70.42% of transactions across 
the time period of our study.  The rate of litigation increased substantially 
over the course of our sample period; one recent study found that litigation 
rates have risen to 92.10% in 2011.120  Our sample matches these findings; 
the litigation rate in our sample rises from 48.57% in 2005 to 95.12% in 
2012.  For the transactions with litigation, 221 or 69.28% result in some 
type of settlement, 65 or 20.38% are dismissed, and the remainder are still 
pending or are abandoned. 
  
 
120. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 469.  As noted earlier, the rate of litigation continues 
to increase, and litigation was filed in 97.5% of transactions in 2013, meaning that virtually every 
deal was challenged.  See supra text accompanying note 6. 
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Table II(A) sets forth information on voting outcomes for our sample. 
 
Table II(A): Voting 
Outcomes           
  N Mean St. Dev.  25th % Median 75th % 
% Yes Votes  
Per Votes Cast  393 96.73% 6.41% 97.13% 99.00% 99.70% 
 
% Yes Votes  
Per Outstanding 
Shares  436 75.82% 8.77% 70.65% 76.00% 81.64% 
 
% Yes Votes  
Per All Yes & No 
Votes  294 97.65% 5.25% 98.03% 99.52% 99.85% 
 
Table II(A) reports shareholder voting outcomes by three different 
metrics: (1) yes votes as a percentage of all votes cast; (2) yes votes as a 
percentage of all outstanding shares;and (3) yes votes as a percentage of all 
yes and no votes cast.  The difference between the first and third 
measurements is that the first measurement includes abstentions and broker 
nonvotes.  In our regressions and data analysis below we employ separately 
run regressions using all three metrics.  We believe that yes votes measured 
as a percentage of votes cast best captures shareholder sentiment for a 
transaction.  The reason is that it captures the sentiment of those 
shareholders who choose to be present at the meeting and cast a ballot or 
abstain.  Shareholder failure to vote at all can indicate a lack of support for 
a transaction, but it may also be caused by a variety of factors that are 
independent of the merits.121  However, by examining all three metrics we 
provide a robustness check to our results. 
The mean percentage of yes votes per outstanding shares is 75.82% 
with a standard deviation of 8.77%.  However, the median percentage of 
yes votes as a percentage of votes cast is 99.00%, meaning that half of all 
transactions get an even higher number of yes votes.  The statistics show 
that shareholder voting in takeover transactions is largely a yes game 
among shareholders who do cast votes.  There is some dispersion among 
transactions however, and the standard deviation for transactions as a 
percentage of votes cast is 6.41%.  We note that the median percentage of 
 
121. For example, retail investors typically engage in very low levels of voting.  See, e.g., 
Press Release, Broadbridge Fin. Solutions, Inc. & PwC’s Ctr. for Bd. Governance, Broadridge and 
PwC Announce New Data on 2013 Proxy Voting Trends 1 (June 4, 2013), available at 
http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-PwC-ProxyPulse-Press-Release-6-4-13.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/UEA8-TRW3 (reporting that 70% of shares held by retail investors 
were not voted). 
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yes votes when measured against outstanding shares is significantly lower, 
meaning that a significant number of shares in any contest are not voted.  
When shares are voted, it is almost always overwhelmingly in support of 
the transaction. 
Table II(B) sets forth descriptive statistics on types of litigation 
settlements and voting outcomes based on percentage of yes votes per votes 
cast. 
 
Table II(B): Voting  
Outcomes and Litigation  
Settlements Per Votes Cast       
  N Mean St. Dev. 25th % Median 75th % 
Disclosure-Only 
Settlements 153 97.25% 5.60% 97.80% 99.10% 99.70% 
 
Amendment  
Settlement 26 97.90% 5.78% 98.54% 99.43% 99.84% 
 
Increase-
Consideration  
Settlement 12 95.64% 7.40% 96.42% 98.84% 99.50% 
Total 191           
 
The number of observations drops to 191 because we do not have 
voting information as a percentage of yes votes per votes cast for all 
observations with litigation, and not all litigation ends in settlement.  The 
median percentage of yes votes for disclosure-only settlements is at 99.10% 
with a standard deviation of 5.60%.  Amendment settlements had a higher 
median percentage of yes votes at 99.43% with a standard deviation of 
5.78%.  Finally, settlements involving an increase in consideration had a 
standard deviation of 7.40% with a median percentage of yes votes at 
98.84%. 
Table II(C) sets forth voting information by yes votes cast, sorted by 
ISS recommendations. 
 
Table II(C): ISS 
Recommendations  
Per Votes Cast         
  N Mean St. Dev. 25th % Median 75th % 
ISS Rec = No 15 81.72% 12.23% 70.00% 80.90% 97.08% 
ISS Rec = Yes 376 97.31% 5.29% 97.36% 99.03% 99.70% 
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As the table shows, there is a large disparity in voting outcomes 
between a positive ISS recommendation and a negative one.122  A 
transaction with a “yes” ISS recommendation has a median percentage of 
yes votes per votes cast of 99.03%.  A transaction with a “no” ISS 
recommendation has a median percentage of yes votes per votes cast of 
80.90%.  In unreported statistics we find that the median percentage of yes 
votes as a percentage of the outstanding shares for a transaction with an ISS 
“no” recommendation is 66.88% compared to 76.51% for a “yes” 
recommendation.  We also find similar results when we examine yes votes 
as a percentage of total yes and no votes.  In those circumstances the 
median percentage of yes votes as a percentage of yes and no votes is 
82.01% for a “no” recommendation compared to 99.55% for a “yes” 
recommendation.  We discuss further the possible effect and issues around 
ISS recommendations below in our regression analysis. 
C. Regression Analysis 
Our regression analysis uses ordinary-least-squares regression.  We 
regress yes votes against the three types of voting metrics: yes votes per 
(1) votes cast, (2) per outstanding shares, and (3) yes and no votes.  We 
include in our regressions a number of transaction variables, including final 
premium paid, the proxy advisors’ recommendation, and institutional 
ownership.  In the text of our Article we discuss the main findings from our 
regressions.  The full regressions with all variables are set forth in the 
Appendix.  Table III examines how shareholder voting outcomes are 
affected by the three types of settlements: disclosure-only settlements, 
amendment settlements, and settlements that produce increased merger 
consideration. 
  
 
122. The potential for ISS recommendations to affect voting outcomes has been discussed 
extensively in the literature.  See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of 
Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 870–77 (2010) (identifying various 
possible reasons for the relationship).  As we discuss below, our findings demonstrate a strong 
correlation between ISS recommendations and voting outcomes but do not provide evidence of 
causation.  See infra subpart II(C). 
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Table III. Shareholder Voting Outcomes 
 and Litigation Settlements123 
 
            
 Yes Votes Per Votes Cast Outstanding Yes and No Votes 
              
  (1) (2)   (3)   
Final Offer Premium 0.105 ** 0.022   0.095 ** 
   (0.03)   (0.74)   (0.04)   
ISS Position 0.155 *** 0.113 *** 0.124 *** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Disclosure-Only Settlement 0.000   0.011   0.003   
  (0.98)   (0.22)   (0.58)   
Amendment Settlement 0.008   0.045 *** 0.017   
  (0.51)   (0.01)   (0.12)   
Consideration-Increase 
Settlement 0.005   0.057 ** 0.004   
  (0.80)   (0.022)   (0.809)   
Observations 391   423   293   
R-squared 0.2658   0.1228   0.2252   
 
The variable with the strongest relationship to voting outcomes is the 
recommendation made by ISS.  The ISS variable, which is a dummy 
variable representing whether ISS recommends a yes or no vote to its 
clients, is positive and significant at the one percent level in all columns.  In 
our regressions, an ISS “yes” recommendation is associated with an 
increase in the number of yes votes by anywhere from 11.30 to 15.5 
percentage points.  The significance of an ISS “yes” recommendation 
 
123. Includes Year-Fixed Effects.  P-values are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The following variables are 
omitted from the table: Initial Offer Premium, Transaction Value (Log), Cash, Auction, Take 
Private, Go Shop, and Super Majority State.  The results for these variables and their definitions 
are set forth in the Appendix.  Final Offer Premium is measured over target’s trading price thirty 
days prior to merger announcement and is the final price paid by the buyer.  ISS Position = 0 
means ISS recommended that its’ client shareholders do not vote or vote against the transactions.  
ISS Position = 1 means that ISS recommended that its’ client shareholders vote for the transaction.  
Disclosure Settlement requires the target to make additional disclosure concerning the transaction; 
Amendment Settlement requires the terms of the transaction to be revised and includes settlements 
which are both Disclosure and Amendment settlements; and Consideration-Increase Settlement 
provides for an increase in the consideration payable to target shareholders.  Consideration-
Increase Settlement also includes settlements that have as a component Amendment or Disclosure 
Settlements.  The sample is defined in subpart II(A).  See supra subpart II(A). 
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explains in part why there is furious lobbying of ISS for its 
recommendations.  It also explains why ISS occupies a controversial role as 
a proxy adviser.124 
It is unclear whether our findings with respect to the ISS 
recommendation reflect causation or simply correlation.  In other words, as 
one of us has observed elsewhere, ISS recommendations may directly 
influence shareholder votes; alternatively they may simply reflect how 
shareholders were going to vote anyway.125  Furthermore, at least in our 
sample, ISS “no” recommendations are infrequent.  We have only 17 “no” 
recommendations and 423 “yes” recommendations for the transactions in 
which we have voting information.126 
Our variable for final offer premium measures the difference between 
the final offer price and the target’s trading price thirty days before the 
announcement of the merger.  We might expect that mergers involving a 
higher premium would generate a higher approval rate, and our regressions 
are consistent with this hypothesis.  The variables for final offer premium 
are significant for the models examining yes votes as a percentage of votes 
cast and yes and no votes as a percentage of votes.  The coefficients on the 
final offer premium in these models are also positive, meaning that the 
higher the final offer premium the higher the number of yes votes.  We note 
that our results are not significant in the models for yes votes as a 
percentage of outstanding shares.  We think it is likely that, in these models, 
the significance of the offer premium is affected by the noisiness of the 
nonvotes.  In addition, it is likely that the premium does not drive the issue 
of whether or not shareholders vote, although it does drive whether they 
cast a yes or no vote once they have decided to vote.127  This is consistent 
with our earlier intuition that shareholders fail to vote largely for reasons 
 
124. The SEC recently issued new guidance about investor reliance on proxy advisors.  See 
Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and Availability of 
Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory Firms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (June 30, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/LFJ2-KSFH (providing “guidance about investment advisers’ responsibilities in voting 
client proxies”). 
125. Choi et al., supra note 122, at 881. 
126. For shareholder voting results reported where the results are per yes and no votes there 
were 9 ISS “no” recommendations and 284 “yes” recommendations, and for yes votes per 
outstanding shares there are 16 “no” recommendations and 407 “yes” recommendations. 
127. In order to exercise appraisal rights shareholders must vote no, so the intention to 
exercise appraisal rights may affect shareholder voting.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2011) 
(“[A] stockholder . . . who has neither voted in favor of the merger or consolidation nor consented 
thereto in writing . . . shall be entitled to an appraisal . . . .”).  However, in regressions reported in 
the Appendix containing other settlement variables we do not find the inclusion of a variable 
reflecting whether shareholders to seek appraisal percentage to be consistently significant. 
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that are independent of the merits of the issue on which they are being 
asked to vote.128 
In terms of our primary hypothesis—that disclosure-only settlements 
would have a negative effect on shareholder voting because they reflect the 
introduction of additional negative information about the merger—our 
regression results do not support this hypothesis.129  Rather we find a non-
effect.  The coefficient for the variable Disclosure Settlement is not 
significant in any columns, meaning that in none of our models is a 
disclosure-only settlement correlated with a significantly different level of 
shareholder support for the merger.130  The lack of a significant relationship 
between disclosure-only settlements and shareholder voting suggests that 
shareholders may not value the additional information from these 
disclosures at least in a way that affects their vote.131 
 
128. In unreported regressions we substitute the initial Offer Premium and Final Offer 
Premium variable with a Low Offer Premium variable.  Low Offer Premium is constructed by 
taking the trailing one-year Final Offer Premium and toggling the variable Low Offer Premium to 
1 if it is below the median and 0 otherwise.  We find no significant change in the regressions, 
including the insignificant effects on the Disclosure Settlement variable.  In models (1) and (3) 
above the variable is negative and significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
129. As a robustness test we also run time-series analysis to examine if there are any excess 
returns upon the announcement of a disclosure settlement.  We hypothesize two alternative 
hypotheses based on the fact that once a takeover is announced, the main driver of a stock price is 
whether or not the takeover will be completed at the price paid.  Our first hypothesis is that 
disclosure settlements will have no effect or a positive effect on share prices.  The reason why is 
that the information is unlikely to significantly affect shareholder voting to an extent significant 
enough to cause shareholders to vote down the transaction.  In this regard, the settlement of the 
litigation may actually cause a target’s share price to increase because any possible delay that may 
be caused by the litigation, such as an injunction, has been removed or the deal has otherwise now 
been vetted.  Alternatively, if disclosure settlements are valued by shareholders to the extent that 
the disclosures in a disclosure settlement may influence the outcome of a transaction or otherwise 
to cause them to agitate to increase the share price or against the transaction, then the share price 
should go down.  In light of these hypotheses, we run a time series analysis using 2, 3, 4, and 5 
day annual returns as measured against the S&P 500 index.  We find significant results at the 5% 
level for all returns with mean excess returns of .0041, .0062, .0069, and .008 and p-values of 
.019, .011, .024, and .017, respectively.  The results provide support for our first hypothesis, that 
disclosure settlements have no effect with some evidence that they may be seen as providing deal 
certainty because of the settlement of the litigation on favorable returns.  Alternatively, the 
favorable result may be seen as shareholder satisfaction with the “vetting” process of this 
litigation and their subsequent confirmation that this is a good deal due to the settlement and 
perhaps the additional disclosure.  We find no support for the second hypothesis that disclosure 
settlements provide information materially and adversely affecting the shareholder vote. 
130. Because our models are linear, we also run in unreported results the models using the log 
value of each shareholder vote.  We do not find any significant results on the Disclosure-
Settlement variable. 
131. We acknowledge that there also may be some unobserved factor present in these 
transactions that produces more negative votes.  However, we also note the relatively high R-
squared for our regressions in columns (1) and (2), indicating that we appear to account for many 
of these variables in our regressions. 
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We note the tension between this finding and the general practice of 
the courts in accepting supplemental disclosure as a benefit to shareholders.  
Chancellor William Chandler appears to have been correct in concluding in 
National City132 that “[n]o evidence exists that the additional disclosures 
significantly affected the outcome of the shareholder vote.”133  The court 
nonetheless awarded the attorneys who conducted the litigation that 
produced these “modest” disclosures a $400,000 fee.134  In contrast, our 
findings suggest that Chancellor Strine’s similar conclusion in Amylin135 
was correct: “[N]one of the disclosures anybody got changed the vote.”136  
Similarly, to the extent that courts characterize supplemental disclosures as 
material, meaning information that a reasonable shareholder would consider 
important in deciding how to vote, our regressions suggest that shareholders 
do not, in fact, consider the disclosures important. 
In contrast, the coefficient on amendment settlements is positive and 
significant in column (2).  The coefficient is .045, which means that the 
shareholder yes vote as measured against outstanding shares increases an 
average of 4.50% points for amendment settlements relative to other 
transactions.  We do not find these results for other measurements of 
shareholder voting in columns (1) and (3).  The reason for the difference 
may be that yes votes as a measure of outstanding votes picks up whether 
shareholders vote or not, while the other metrics are whether shareholders 
vote yes or no.  We do not have an explanation why an amendment 
settlement may pick up more shareholder votes as opposed to more yes 
votes.  We note that of settlements in our sample involving an amendment 
to the merger agreement, 55% involved a reduction of the termination 
fee.137 
The variable for consideration-increase settlements is also statistically 
significant but not significantly more than amendment settlements and 
 
132. In re Nat’l City Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 4123-CC, 2009 WL 2425389, at *6 (Del. Ch. 
July 31, 2009), aff’d, 998 A.2d 851 (Del. 2010). 
133. Id. at *6. 
134. Id. at *4, *6. 
135. In re Amylin Pharm., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 7673-CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 2013). 
136. Transcript of Hearing on Peter Doucet’s Motion to Intervene and for an Award of 
Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, Settlement Hearing, and Rulings of the Court at 23–24, In re 
Amylin Pharm., Inc. S’Holders Litig., No. 7673–CS (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2013) [hereinafter 
Transcript of Amylin Hearing]; see also id. at 23 (making the further point that “not one of [the 
supplemental disclosures] would any rational investor think was materially important”). 
137. In unreported regressions, we do not find any significance when we include a disclosure-
plus variable.  These settlements include disclosure plus an amendment.  Our findings support one 
hypothesis—that the disclosure component is an add-on that does not significantly contribute 
value to the settlement.  This finding is also consistent with judge and practitioner criticism that 
these settlements simply change a term or two of the merger agreement and add on a disclosure 
component to maximize attorneys’ fees.  In other words, our findings support the conclusion that 
shareholders view these settlements as neither value enhancing nor value destroying. 
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again only in column (2).  This result may seem counterintuitive—if a deal 
has been litigation tested and that litigation generated a higher price, one 
might think shareholder approval rates would be significantly higher.  One 
possible explanation is that deals in which the litigation produces a higher 
price are deals that were suspect to begin with—deals that raise serious 
issues about process or conflicts of interest.  While these concerns warrant 
an economically meaningful settlement, the price increase negotiated as a 
result of the settlement may still be lower than the reserve price of some 
shareholders.138 
Hypothesizing that because courts attempt to award attorneys’ fees in 
cases that produce meaningful benefits to shareholders, we next test the 
significance of the attorneys’ fee award in predicting the percentage of yes 
votes. 
  
 
138. We note that Increase-Consideration Settlements disproportionately occur in going-
private transactions.  5 of 12 such settlements occur in transactions that are going private, or 
41.67%, yet only 22 out of 453 transactions in our sample are going private transactions. 
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Table IV. Shareholder Voting, Attorneys’ Fees, and Settlements139 
 
            
 Yes Votes Per Votes Cast 
Outstanding 
Shares Yes and No Votes 
              
  (1)   (2)   (3)   
Final Offer Premium 0.172 *** 
  
0.08  0.18 *** 
  (0.00)   (0.37)   (0.00)   
ISS Position 0.195 ***     0.14 *** 0.169 *** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Attorney Fee > 500 0.006   0.01   ‒0.003   
  (0.54)   (0.52)   (0.74)   
Attorney Fees (Log) ‒0.013 ** ‒0.005   ‒0.005   
  (0.03)   (0.57)   (0.36)   
Disclosure-Only 
Settlement 0.006   ‒0.010   0.016    
  (0.67)   (0.64)   (0.21)   
Amendment 
Settlement 0.027 * 0.029   0.034 **  
  (0.09)   (0.27)   (0.03)   
Consideration-
Increase Settlement 0.035   0.046   0.024    
  (0.11)   (0.19)   (0.23)   
Observations 175   190   144   
R-squared 0.4259   0.1558   0.3354   
 
Contrary to the hypothesis that attorneys’ fees are ex post facto 
assessments of the merit of merger litigation, we do not find any consistent 
relationship between the fee and the shareholder vote.  In column (1) we 
find a slight relationship between attorneys’ fees and the percentage of yes 
votes per vote cast.  The coefficient is significant and negative, meaning the 
lower the attorneys’ fee, the lower the number of yes votes as a percentage 
of votes cast.  But the models measuring yes votes as a percentage of 
 
139. Includes Year Fixed Effects.  The following variables are omitted from the table: Initial 
Offer Premium, Transaction Value (Log), Cash, Auction, Take Private, Go-Shop, and Super 
Majority State.  The results for these variables and their definitions are set forth in the Appendix.  
Attorneys’ Fees (Log) is the log value of attorneys’ fee awarded in the litigation.  Attorneys’ Fee > 
500 coded = 1 if the attorneys’ fees awarded in the litigation are greater than $500,000 and = 0 if 
the attorneys’ fees awarded are less than $500,000.  The sample and all other variables are defined 
in supra note 123. 
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outstanding shares and yes and no votes are not significant for this variable.  
In addition, we do not find significance when we include a dummy variable 
for whether attorneys’ fees are above or below $500,000, a threshold that 
some scholars have found to be the approximate average for disclosure 
settlements and that has been cited by the courts as a starting point in 
determining the appropriate award for a meritorious settlement.140 
These findings are cause for concern.  To the extent that courts are 
making fee determinations to incentivize litigation that is valuable to 
shareholders, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between 
the size of the award and the subsequent shareholder vote.  Yet if the 
disclosure does not affect the shareholder vote, it is difficult to see how 
shareholders benefit from it.141  Notably, the coefficients for ISS Position in 
this model become more significant, implying that a “yes” recommendation 
for this sample correlates with a percentage change in votes ranging from 
14.00% to 19.50%.142 
We note that in columns (1) and (3) the coefficient on amendment 
settlements is positive and significant, meaning those transactions with such 
a settlement obtain a higher percentage of yes votes.  In contrast, the 
variable consideration-increase settlement is not significant in any model.  
We are not certain of the reason for the differences in this model for 
amendment settlements and increased consideration settlements from our 
prior model in Table III.  We note that in this model, we include only 
settlements with attorneys’ fees, meaning that we have a smaller sample 
than in Table III and that, in addition, our sample sizes for both these 
categories are substantially smaller than for disclosure-only settlements.  It 
may also be the case that outlier cases, in which the merger is substantively 
unfair, may be driving the results in these categories. 
  
 
140. See Gen-Probe Transcript, supra note 13, at 46 (“I try to stick to the ranges [for fee 
amounts], and I have said repeatedly about the $450 to $500,000 range as being something that I 
start on.”); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 482 tbl.IV.B (providing statistics on average fee 
awards by state). 
141. One could hypothesize that shareholder voting rights, like voting rights of citizens, 
implicate autonomy considerations such that a shareholder derives some value from voting in the 
same way but while in possession of better information about the choice.  Even if this were true, it 
is not clear that merger litigation is intended to foster these democratic values as opposed to 
shareholders’ economic interests. 
142. We also note in the Appendix that in models including the appraisal variable, the 
disclosure variable is also not significant and negative, meaning that in the presence of a 
disclosure settlement, there are fewer yes votes as a percentage of outstanding shares.  However, 
the variables for amendment settlement and consideration-increase settlement are significant in all 
models. 
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Table V. Shareholder Voting  
Outcomes & Institutional Ownership143 
 
Shareholder Yes Votes Per Votes Cast 
  All Transactions 
Transaction Value  
< $500M 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   
Institutional Ownership % 0.041 ** 0.023   ‒0.043   
  (0.01)   (0.52)   (0.74)   
Top 5 Institutional Ownership   ‒0.108   0.086   
      (0.56)   (0.84)   
Top 10 Institutional Ownership   0.086   0.141   
      (0.58)   (0.74)   
ISS Position     0.154 *** 0.232 *** 
      (0.00)   (0.00)   
Disclosure-Only Settlement   ‒0.003   ‒0.021   
      (0.68)   (0.19)   
Amendment Settlement     0.009   ‒0.035   
      (0.47)   (0.31)   
Consideration-Increase Settlement   0.002   0.025   
      (0.91)   (0.75)   
Observations 393   391   140   
R-squared 0.0543   0.2642   0.3439   
 
In our final table, we regress shareholder yes votes as a percentage of 
votes cast against various institutional ownership variables.  We 
hypothesize that institutional shareholders may be better able to assess 
merger-litigation settlements, particularly any additional disclosure made 
upon a disclosure settlement.  If this hypothesis is true, we would expect to 
 
143. Includes Year-Fixed Effects.  The following variables are omitted from the table: Initial 
Offer Premium, Final Offer Premium, and Transaction Value (Log). In models (2) and (3), the 
variable Maximum Institutional Ownership is also omitted.  The results for these variables and 
their definitions are set forth in the Appendix.  Institutional Ownership % is the percentage of total 
institutional ownership.  Top 5 Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the largest 
5 institutional owners.  Top 10 Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the largest 
10 institutional owners.  Institutional ownership for each of these variables is as of the quarter end 
immediately prior to the shareholder meeting date.  The sample and all other variables are defined 
in supra note 123. 
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see settlements have a greater effect on merger votes in companies with 
high levels of institutional ownership.  Measured in a variety of ways, 
however, we find no effect of institutional ownership on shareholder 
assessment of merger-litigation settlements.  However, the R-squared in 
column (1) is relatively low, meaning that the drivers of voting in this 
model are attributable to other variables.  This implies that while the 
institutional investor ownership percentage does affect voting, it may be 
captured by these other variables. 
To further test the effect of institutional ownership on shareholder 
voting, we theorize that in smaller transactions (less than $500 million), 
institutional shareholders may affect the outcome more greatly.  In column 
(3) we do not find this to be the case; the institutional shareholder variable 
is not significant.  We also do not find any significance in these smaller 
transactions for institutional ownership variables. 
We run the same regressions in unreported models using the dependent 
variable percentage of yes votes per yes and no votes.  We find in all 
models that the disclosure settlement variable is insignificant.  Again, the 
most significant variable for institutional investors is the ISS 
recommendation, which is positive and significant at the one percent level.  
Similar to our earlier findings, institutional investors do not appear to find 
disclosure settlements to be significant. 
III.  Policy Implications: Ending Fees for Disclosure Settlements 
The findings in Part II raise serious concerns about the existing state of 
merger litigation, in which the vast majority of mergers are challenged and 
the resulting litigation produces a disclosure-only settlement, but the 
disclosures do not seem to affect shareholder voting on the merger.  Insofar 
as disclosure-only settlements do not provide shareholders with useful 
information, they are wasteful, clogging the courts and increasing 
transaction costs for no reason.  Nevertheless, the current practice of 
treating disclosure-only settlements as a shareholder benefit sufficient to 
entitle plaintiffs’ attorneys to a fee award incentivizes attorneys to file 
claims in order to win those settlements.  On the basis of our empirical 
findings, we argue that this incentive is misplaced. 
The fundamental claim in state court merger litigation is based on 
allegations that the merger process and the merger price are unfair.144  It 
appears that, when plaintiffs’ attorneys are unable to demonstrate 
unfairness, they turn to supplemental disclosures to justify an award of fees 
for their time and expense.  In contrast, private litigation under the federal 
 
144. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (defining 
substantive fairness as involving issues of process and price). 
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securities laws focuses precisely on material deficiencies in disclosure 
against a backdrop of extensive disclosure regulation.145  In our view, this is 
a form of efficient specialization that ought to be recognized as a matter of 
law.  Merger litigation, under state law, should address substantive and 
procedural fairness.  Merger litigation, under federal law, should address 
disclosure quality. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has already taken the first step in this 
direction, holding in Santa Fe v. Green that the federal antifraud provisions 
do not address issues of merger fairness.146  In this Part, we propose that 
Delaware cooperate by limiting the role of state law in regulating merger 
disclosure.  Specifically, we propose that the courts reject disclosure-only 
settlements as providing a benefit to shareholders sufficient to justify the 
award of attorneys’ fees, at least in cases involving publicly traded target 
companies.  The subparts that follow develop this proposal in greater detail, 
explaining how the federal securities laws are better suited to regulating 
merger disclosure, anticipating and answering objections, and then offering 
specific suggestions on how the solution might be implemented. 
A. Federal Regulation of Merger Disclosure 
The federal securities laws are all about disclosure.147  The public 
offering process has, as its central feature, a detailed disclosure document—
the Registration Statement—the role of which is established by Section 5 of 
the Securities Act of 1933.148  The applicable rules concerning subjects such 
as prefiling offers, prospectus delivery, liabilities, and due diligence are all 
designed to enhance the effectiveness of the disclosure mandate.  Following 
an initial public offering, federal law subjects public companies to 
continued periodic disclosure obligations through the reporting require-
ments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the rules 
promulgated thereunder.149 
 
145. See generally Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on 
Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: 
The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 456 (1994) (describing the role of private 
securities fraud litigation in enforcing the federal mandatory disclosure system). 
146. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977). 
147. 1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 10 (6th ed. 2011). 
148. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77f(c) (2012). 
149. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).  What it means to be a 
public company is somewhat different for purposes of the registration requirements of the 
Securities Act and the periodic reporting requirements of the 1934 Act.  See Donald C. 
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After 
the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 343–46 (2013) (describing “bifurcation” in the concept of 
“publicness”). 
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Federal law also mandates disclosure in connection with shareholder 
voting through the federal proxy rules.150  As a result, the federal securities 
laws have long been the primary source of explicit disclosure obligations in 
connection with mergers and acquisitions involving public companies.151  
The SEC mandates certain disclosures in the Schedule 14A proxy 
statement,152 and it supplements these requirements with particularized 
additional disclosures in connection with tender offers and going-private 
transactions.153  Thus, in most cases, the disclosure deficiencies challenged 
in state merger litigation are located within a federally mandated disclosure 
document.  In addition, the supplemental disclosures that are agreed upon in 
the settlement of state court litigation are ultimately incorporated into the 
federally mandated form. 
The federal disclosure requirements are primarily rule based.154  The 
federal statutes and the SEC rules thereunder require the disclosure of 
information concerning many of the same items that are frequently the 
subject of state law disclosure-only settlements, including valuation 
procedures, financial advisor opinions, and potential conflicts of interest.155  
For example, the proxy rules require detailed transaction information, 
including information relating to reports, opinions, or appraisals given by 
financial advisors.156  Disclosure concerning the selection and compensation 
of outside financial advisors is likewise required in going-private 
transactions, along with disclosure of any other material relationships 
between the company and the advisor.157 
 
150. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(h)(1)(D). 
151. State corporation law does require corporations to disclose shareholder appraisal rights.  
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d) (2011); see also Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 859 A.2d 80, 
85–88 (Del. Ch. 2004) (addressing the disclosure requirements under the appraisal statute). 
152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2014). 
153. Id. §§ 240.14d-100, 240.13e-100. 
154. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1023 
(2013) (describing how Sarbanes-Oxley replaced flexible state law standards with “firm rules”).  
See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992) (articulating the distinction between using rules versus standards to regulate). 
155. See Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987, 991, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding 
that in a merger between corporations A and B, failure to disclose that general counsel of 
corporation A personally represented senior executives of corporation B and that he and his firm 
served as counsel to several entities controlled by these executives constituted material 
omissions); Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The violation 
arising from the failure to disclose such a potential conflict of interest does not turn on the failure 
to disclose a director’s true motivations but rather stems from the failure to disclose a fact that 
puts the shareholder on notice of a potential impairment of the director’s judgment.”); Joel 
Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 38–46 (1993) (discussing disclosure 
obligations under 13e-3 for going-private transactions). 
156. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101. 
157. Id. § 229.1015(b). 
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The disclosure requirements of federal law reflect a delicate balance.  
On the one hand, some commentators argue that, in general, more 
information is better.158  Other commentators argue that even some material 
disclosures might be counterproductive if they overwhelm investors with 
too much information that cannot be used properly.159  The SEC’s 
disclosure requirements are subject to ongoing debate, public scrutiny, and, 
on occasion, legal challenge,160 as the SEC seeks to strike an appropriate 
balance both in terms of providing useful information and imposing 
reasonable costs on market participants.  As some commentators have 
noted, the SEC’s rule-making process offers particular advantages in 
evaluating the costs and benefits of proposed disclosure requirements, such 
as the opportunity for affected market participants to provide input.161 
The principal difference between state and federal disclosure mandates 
in connection with merger transactions is that federal law involves 
proscriptive rules of general application, whereas Delaware judges 
articulate disclosure requirements in the fact-specific context of individual 
transactions.162  Under federal law, the failure to disclose even material 
information is not actionable unless SEC rules specifically mandate 
disclosure of that information or unless the omission renders other 
disclosures misleading.163  The failure to include all material information in 
a proxy statement does not violate federal law.164  As the Third Circuit 
explained: “[O]mission of information from a proxy statement will violate 
 
158. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A 
Proposal for Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 749, 795 (2007) (arguing for codification of disclosure rules relating to 
executives’ private facts).  
159. E.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences 
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003); see also Steven M. Davidoff & 
Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 603 (2013) (“[T]he role of 
disclosure in investment decisions is far more limited, and far less straightforward, than is 
typically assumed.”). 
160. See, e.g., Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 60,090, 60,090–91 (Oct. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (describing and 
defending proposed amendments to disclosure requirements in connection with going-private 
transactions); Petition for Review at 1, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 
2013) (No. 12-1422) (challenging the SEC’s conflict minerals disclosure requirement). 
161. See David Friedman, Note, The Regulator in Robes: Examining the SEC and the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s Parallel Disclosure Regimes, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1573–75 
(2013) (arguing that the SEC should codify Delaware’s disclosure rules through notice-and-
comment rule making and eliminate the existence of two different sets of disclosure 
requirements). 
162. See id. at 1553 (“[T]he fact-specific nature of Chancery decisions differentiates them 
from the broad, prospective rules typically generated by regulatory agencies.”). 
163. Resnik v. Swartz, 303 F.3d 147, 151 n.2 (2d Cir. 2002). 
164. See, e.g., Perelman v. Pa. Real Estate Inv. Trust, 432 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 
1977). 
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[§ 14(a) and Rule 14a–9] if either the SEC regulations specifically require 
disclosure of the omitted information in a proxy statement, or the omission 
makes other statements in the proxy statement materially false or 
misleading.”165 
The distinction is perhaps best illustrated with respect to the disclosure 
of compensation and conflicts of financial advisors.  The SEC requires a 
descriptive summary of the financial advisors’ compensation.166  Staff 
interpretations have often required a breakdown of how much of the 
advisor’s fee was fixed versus contingent.167  Delaware precedent, in 
contrast, requires disclosure of “substantial” contingent fees without clearly 
articulating the standard by which a fee is judged to be substantial.168  
Likewise, federal law requires the disclosure of “material relationships” 
existing between the advisor and the other party in the transaction over the 
prior two years,169 but several Delaware decisions have compelled 
considerably more detailed disclosure about investment banker 
relationships and potential conflicts.170  Finally, Delaware has recently 
required the disclosure of a financial advisor’s interest in a deal, through 
institutional or personal holdings, while SEC rules are silent on this issue.171  
Thus, in El Paso,172 Chancellor Strine termed Goldman’s lead banker’s 
failure to disclose a personal $340,000 ownership interest in the buyer’s 
stock “very troubling,” although it was unclear that disclosure of this 
interest was required under federal law.173 
Shareholders can enforce their disclosure rights under federal law 
through litigation.  Rule 14a-9 prohibits fraud in connection with the 
solicitation of proxies, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it provides 
a private right of action for false and misleading proxy statements.174  In 
addition, to the extent that shareholders sell their stock in connection with a 
merger, they have a cause of action under SEC rule 10b-5.175  The elements 
 
165. Seinfeld v. Becherer, 461 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Resnik, 303 F.3d at 151) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
166. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1015(b)(4) (2014). 
167. For more information on staff interpretations of the rule, see generally Steven M. 
Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1592–93 (2006). 
168. Friedman, supra note 161, at 1554–56. 
169. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1015(b)(4); FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL 
§ 5150(a)(3) (2008), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid= 
2403&element _id=6832, archived at http://perma.cc/6QBN-9PG4. 
170. Friedman, supra note 161, at 1556–58. 
171. See id. at 1553 (comparing Delaware decisions to the SEC’s “lax” rules for disclosure of 
financial advisors’ conflicts). 
172. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
173. Id. at 442. 
174. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 429–31 (1964). 
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2014). 
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of proxy fraud and securities fraud are quite similar.  Both require a 
material misstatement or omission, damages, and a causal relationship 
between the two.176 
Importantly, liability under federal law turns on materiality.177  
Misstatements and omissions in federally mandated disclosure documents 
are actionable if and only if they are material.178  In the context of the proxy 
statement, the Supreme Court stated that a fact is material “if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important in deciding how to vote.”179  Critically, as Richard Booth has 
explained, this means that some investors must react to the information.180 
The federal courts have developed an extensive jurisprudence 
concerning the materiality requirement.181  Courts consider the role of 
specific statements within the context of the document in which they are 
contained, the relevance of other disclosures and general information 
environment applicable to the issuer, the nature of the information involved 
(including its capacity to affect the market and the degree to which it is 
speculative or subjective), the importance of the speaker’s identity to the 
materiality determination, and a host of other factors.182  Although the legal 
definition of materiality is broadly inclusive,183 courts have also adopted 
various qualifications to evaluate the specific disclosures in the context of 
the particular document in which it is contained, the transaction that it 
involves, and the overall amount of information present in the market.184 
Private litigation is a viable remedy for truly deficient disclosures in a 
proxy statement.  Federal litigation offers two potential mechanisms for 
redress.  First, federal courts will provide expedited proceedings and issue 
an injunction mandating corrective disclosure prior to the shareholder 
 
176. Compare Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 228 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(describing elements of a claim under Rule 14a-9), with Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton 
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (listing elements of a violation of Rule 10b-5).  The Supreme 
Court has reserved the question of whether scienter, which is required in a private action under 
Rule 10b-5, is also required under Rule 14a-9.  Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 
1090 n.5 (1991). 
177. Notably, the federal courts have interpreted the materiality requirement analogously with 
respect to proxy fraud and federal securities fraud.  Heminway, supra note 158, at 759. 
178. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976). 
179. Id. at 449. 
180. Richard A. Booth, The Two Faces Of Materiality, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 519 (2013). 
181. See Heminway, supra note 158, at 756–59 (describing decisional law on materiality). 
182. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1312 (2011) (explaining that 
“assessing materiality”. . . “is a fact-specific inquiry”); Heminway, supra note 158, at 756–59. 
183. Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of “Material” in Securities 
Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 169 (2011). 
184. See id. at 184–86 (identifying examples such as the “bespeaks caution” doctrine and the 
truth-in-the-market exception). 
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vote.185  Second, federal courts can provide ex post money damages.186  
That these remedies are meaningful is illustrated by the fact that federal 
litigation frequently settles for meaningful monetary consideration.  For 
example, in the merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, it was later 
revealed that Bank of America had learned of massive losses at Merrill 
Lynch just before the Bank of America shareholder vote on the 
transaction.187  Shareholders filed a federal claim under Rule 14a-9 in the 
Southern District of New York and subsequently settled, not for a form of 
nonpecuniary relief, but rather for $2.4 billion in money damages.188 
Notably, federal litigation also addresses the potential for frivolous 
litigation.  In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),189 
Congress adopted a variety of substantive and procedural reforms designed 
to discourage meritless cases while retaining meaningful litigation 
challenges.  For example, the PSLRA imposes a heightened pleading 
standard for the allegation of disclosure violations.  Pursuant to the PSLRA, 
to state a claim a complaint must (1) “specify each statement alleged to 
have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading,”190 and (2) “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”191  This 
standard applies to claims under Rule 14a-9 as well as Rule 10b-5.192  
Courts have also concluded that many of the procedural reforms of the 
PSLRA, for example, apply to proxy fraud litigation, such as the stay of 
discovery pending the resolution of a motion to dismiss.193  Similarly, 
courts have noted that the causation requirement prevents every disclosure 
 
185. E.g., Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Adams, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1150 (D. 
Kan. 2001); Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F. Supp. 1266, 1267–68, 1295 (D. Mass. 1988).  
186. E.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1303–04 (2d Cir. 1973). 
187. Halah Touryalai, Bank of America Will Pony Up $2.4 Billion to Investors over Merrill 
Lynch Merger, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2 
012/09/28/bank-of-america-will-pay-investors-2-4-billion-over-merrill-lynch-merger, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RCE7-HGC8. 
188. Timothy Raub, Final Approval of $2.4Billion Settlement Granted in Bank of America 
Securities Suit, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM LITIG. (Apr. 8, 2013, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/litigation/b/litigation-blog/archive/2013/04/08/final-
approval-of-2-4billion-settlement-granted-in-bank-of-america-securities-suit.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9GA6-PJRE. 
189. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
191. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
192. See Little Gem Life Scis. LLC v. Orphan Med., Inc., 537 F.3d 913, 915, 917 (8th Cir. 
2008) (applying the heightened pleading requirements under the PSLRA to a claim under Rule 
14a-9). 
193. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., No. 3:12–cv–281, 2012 WL 5479061, at *1–2 
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2012) (applying the PSLRA discovery stay to proxy fraud litigation); Dipple 
v. Odell, 870 F. Supp. 2d 386, 392–93 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (same). 
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failure from constituting a violation of Rule 14a-9.194  Accordingly, both 
federal regulation and federal litigation attempt to strike a balance in terms 
of the scope of disclosure that they mandate and the extent to which 
violations of the regulatory requirements can be challenged through 
litigation. 
B. State Law Disclosure Litigation 
Although, as noted above, the core concern of state fiduciary duty 
litigation with regard to mergers is the substantive fairness of the 
transaction, state law merger complaints often include disclosure claims.  
Delaware courts have adopted a materiality requirement that is akin to the 
federal standard.  According to the court in Sauer–Danfoss, in order for 
supplemental disclosures to constitute a substantial benefit sufficient to 
justify an award of attorneys’ fees, the disclosures must be material.195  This 
standard was applied by Chancellor Strine in Amylin to deny a fee request 
on the basis of the finding that the supplemental disclosures amounted only 
to “additional meaningless disclosures that did not materially change the 
mix of information.”196  Noting that not all information can be disclosed197 
and that all details, even of a financial advisor’s analysis, are not 
required,198 the Chancellor reaffirmed the materiality standard.199  The 
Chancellor emphasized that materiality is best demonstrated by a 
comparative analysis showing how a set of supplemental disclosures 
meaningfully altered the information previously available.200 
Nevertheless, materiality analysis operates differently in Delaware 
merger litigation from the way it operates in federal securities law cases.  
First, courts decide Delaware merger cases on an expedited basis, according 
to the lifecycle of the underlying transaction.201  If a case is not disposed of 
through a motion during the pendency of the transaction, it will most likely 
 
194. See, e.g., Lane v. Page, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (D.N.M. 2009) (“Omissions that 
might ultimately be minor in a particular factual scenario, but which contravene an SEC 
regulation . . . must satisfy causation requirements, preventing insubstantial violations of 
disclosure requirements from becoming actionable claims for damages.”). 
195. In re Sauer–Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1127 (Del. Ch. 2011).  Under 
the federal definition, a disclosure is material if “the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”  
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
196. Transcript of Amylin Hearing, supra note 136, at 22. 
197. Id. at 24.  
198. Id. at 25. 
199. Id. at 28. 
200. Id. at 30. 
201. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1063–64 (explaining that both parties to merger 
litigation will seek expedited processes because of the potential for a transaction delayed by 
litigation to fall apart). 
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be settled prior to the transaction’s close so that the transacting parties can 
eliminate it as a contingent liability.202  This means that Chancery Court 
judges reviewing merger disclosures always do so under substantial time 
pressure, either in the context of a motion to dismiss or in the context of 
approving a disclosure settlement.  As a result, most of the court’s rulings 
on materiality come in the form of transcript opinions.203  Delaware’s 
release of transcript opinions seeks to strike a balance between efficiency of 
time, on the one hand, and clarity of precedent, on the other.  By contrast, 
federal cases are more frequently litigated postclosing and can offer the 
more formal, precedent-driven consideration of materiality described 
above.204 
Second, Delaware courts analyze the materiality of disclosures in 
connection with the review and approval of settlements, a judicial act that is 
typically, as we emphasized above, nonadversarial.205  As a result, 
defendants generally do not oppose and often tacitly support plaintiffs’ 
assertions concerning the materiality of disclosures.206  To put this into 
context, the courts in Delaware are rarely faced with arguments on both 
sides of questions such as whether a proffered supplemental disclosure is 
largely duplicative of other information already disclosed to the market or is 
insufficiently factual or too tentative to be useful.  By contrast, federal 
judges rule on materiality as a critical element establishing fraud.207  As a 
result, the issue is fully briefed and argued by both sides to the dispute.  
Hence, federal judges routinely receive better information in connection 
with each materiality determination.  When federal judges articulate the 
basis of their materiality determination in formal judicial opinions, this 
information produces a higher quality body of precedent that judges can 
draw upon in future determinations.  By contrast, unopposed settlements, as 
even the Delaware judiciary acknowledges, make poor reference points.208 
In addition, the structure of state court litigation claims creates an odd 
bifurcation.  The primary allegations of the complaint challenge the 
merger’s substantive and procedural fairness, typically encompassing 
 
202. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
203. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1125–26. 
204. See supra subpart III(A). 
205. See supra subpart I(B).  In a minority of proceedings there are objectors, but these are 
often pro se litigants, and their objections while noted do not interfere with the main settlement.  
See Jeffries, supra note 10, at 59 (“[T]hese fee awards are rarely objected to and thus rarely 
appealed.”). 
206. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 15, at 1093 (discussing potential for agreement or 
collusion between litigants seeking to win judicial approval of settlements). 
207. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
208. See In re Sauer–Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1137 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“In 
actuality, when reviewing an uncontested fee application, the Court suffers from an informational 
vacuum created when the adversity of interests that drives the common law process dissipates.”). 
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possible conflicts of interest, failure to shop the company adequately or 
otherwise maximize the sales price, or concerns about provisions in the 
merger agreement such as termination fees.  In contrast, the incidental 
disclosure claims are generally not well developed in the complaint nor, 
because they are incidental, are disclosure claims subjected to careful 
scrutiny at the pleading stage pursuant to a motion to dismiss.  What all of 
this reveals, of course, is that state court litigation really is not about 
disclosure. 
Consider, for example, the Sauer–Danfoss complaint.209  Count III 
alleges a breach of the defendants’ fiduciary duty of disclosure in that “[t]he 
Recommendation Statement fails to disclose material information, 
including financial information and information necessary to prevent the 
statements contained therein from being misleading.”210  The complaint 
does not identify a single piece of omitted information as a basis for this 
claim.  Nor does the complaint identify a basis upon which the allegedly 
omitted information was required to be disclosed.  Simply put, the 
allegations fall woefully short of the pleading standard that would be 
required to file a federal claim under Rule 14a-9.211 
Most problematically, perhaps, the merits of the materiality question 
are not squarely before the state court in merger litigation.  State courts 
address materiality not in connection with deciding fraud claims, but rather 
in connection with approving negotiated settlements.  In this context, the 
court is not asked to decide whether the proxy would have been materially 
misleading to investors without the supplemental disclosure but rather 
whether a negotiated package of supplemental disclosures, once added to 
the proxy statement, benefits shareholders.212  Put in these terms, it is 
difficult for a court to say that shareholders would not like to know an 
additional piece of information, especially when there is no adverse party 
briefing the court on why the additional information provides no real 
benefit.213  Our empirical results, however, are fairly clear that supplemental 
disclosures do not in fact change shareholder behavior and, in that sense at 
least, provide no real benefit.  The next subpart addresses what ought to be 
done about it. 
C. Eliminating the State Law Claim for Disclosure 
Delaware courts provide a bounty for plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle for 
disclosure by requiring the defendant corporation to pay their fees.  This 
 
209. Sauer–Danfoss Complaint, supra note 32. 
210. Id. para. 88, at 26. 
211. See supra notes 189–93and accompanying text. 
212. Griffith, supra note 47, at 22–25. 
213. Id. at 21–22. 
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bounty is based on the premise that disclosure-only settlements provide a 
“substantial benefit” to the shareholder class.  Our findings demonstrate that 
this premise is misguided.  The benefit produced by disclosure-only 
settlements is anything but substantial.  Indeed, it would be closer to the 
truth to say that it is imaginary. 
The cost of these suits, however, is very real.  These suits generate 
litigation costs—specifically the attorneys’ fees on both the plaintiff and 
defense sides—as well as court costs and the uncertainty and risk created by 
subjecting every merger to litigation, often in multiple jurisdictions.214  The 
cases also may distort Delaware law, if the Delaware courts seek to 
accommodate these claims and keep them from migrating to other 
jurisdictions.215  Basic cost–benefit analysis therefore suggests that 
something ought to be done to significantly reduce these settlements.  Our 
suggestion is simple.  We propose that Delaware stop recognizing 
disclosure-only settlements as a substantial benefit for the purposes of a fee 
award in class litigation involving public company mergers.216 
Our rule would have the effect of eliminating the financing for 
disclosure-only settlements, but only disclosure-only settlements, in state 
court merger litigation.  Our proposal explicitly recognizes that merger 
litigation can produce substantial shareholder benefit—the Southern Peru217 
decision, for example, clearly shows that it can—and we do not limit the 
right of shareholders to sue in connection with mergers.  Nor do we seek to 
address the scope of the duty of disclosure under state law.218 
Delaware courts have been struggling for several years to accomplish a 
similar outcome by more modest means—a searching and case-specific 
inquiry into whether the supplemental disclosures are really 
 
214. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 6, at 3 (noting frequency of multijurisdictional 
litigation). 
215. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 495 (observing that Delaware courts tend to award 
higher fees in cases that may be filed in multiple jurisdictions). 
216. We confine our proposed rule to public company mergers because our empirical 
evidence is limited to that context and also because the proxy rules regulate only publicly traded 
companies.  Delaware courts have recognized a difference between the disclosure obligations of 
public and private companies in other contexts as well.  Compare Skeen v. Jo–Ann Stores, Inc., 
750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000) (limiting disclosure obligations in an appraisal case involving a 
publicly held corporation), with Erickson v. Centennial Beuregard Cellular LLC, No. Civ.A. 
19974, 2003 WL 1878583, at *6–9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2003) (expanding disclosure obligations in 
an appraisal case involving a privately held corporation and differentiating Skeen on the public–
private distinction). 
217. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
218. Others have questioned the utility of a state law duty of disclosure that differs from the 
duties applicable under the federal securities laws.  See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 161, at 1577–
79 (advocating unification of the legal standard through SEC rule making adopting the Delaware 
duty of disclosure). 
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“meaningful.”219  Nevertheless, our empirical results suggest that the 
inquiry in the context of the settlement approval decision is ineffective.  
The vast majority of cases settled for supplemental disclosures—in which 
the lawyers receive a nonzero fee award—appear to have no effect on the 
shareholder vote.  We can find no statistically significant relationship 
between the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded and the quality of the 
resulting disclosure as measured by its effect on the shareholder vote.220  To 
the extent that the courts are trying to award nominal fees in weak cases in 
order to discourage nonmeritorious litigation, the practice does not seem to 
be effective—litigation rates have been consistently increasing even as the 
average fee award declines in size.  It is simply implausible to explain the 
growth in litigation challenges by a decline in the quality of merger 
disclosures.  Rather, existing doctrine, which treats a disclosure-only 
settlement as providing shareholders with a substantial benefit, is creating 
bad incentives. 
D. Elimination of Disclosure-Only Fee Awards as Conceptual 
Preemption 
The obvious objection to our proposal is that by eliminating fee awards 
in disclosure-only settlements we reduce the incentive for litigation in cases 
in which the proxy statement is truly deficient.  Moreover, removing the 
threat of shareholder litigation in these cases might lead to an increase in 
materially deficient disclosure by eliminating the deterrent effect of 
disclosure claims.  Barring disclosure settlements may open the door to 
materially deficient disclosure. 
Our proposal does not eliminate litigation challenges to merger 
disclosure, however; it simply relegates those challenges to a highly 
developed body of law and regulation and a forum specialized in applying 
that law—litigation under the federal securities laws in federal courts.  
Federal law is, as we explained, better designed to address merger 
disclosure standards than Delaware’s duty of disclosure, and federal courts 
are well-situated to enforce that law efficiently.  Delaware law and 
Delaware courts, by contrast, are well-suited to pass on the substantive 
fairness of merger transactions.  We would reserve for state courts the 
promulgation of legal standards for evaluating the substantive and 
procedural fairness of mergers, and we would reserve for federal law the 
regulation of merger disclosure. 
Our proposal borrows from and extends the fundamental balance of 
regulatory authority between Delaware, on the one hand, and the SEC, on 
 
219. See supra subpart I(C). 
220. See supra Table IV. 
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the other, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 1977.  In 
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the Supreme Court considered a 
challenge under Rule 10b-5 to a short-form merger pursuant to Delaware 
law.221  The plaintiffs’ claim was that the merger was fraudulent because it 
deprived plaintiffs of the fair value of their stock at an inadequate price.222  
The Court concluded that this allegation failed to state a claim under federal 
law.223  Substantive fairness is not the same as deception, and the Court held 
that federal law provides a remedy only for the latter.224  With respect to 
substantive fairness, the Court stated that this was an issue for state 
corporate law.225  The Court refused to federalize this body of law and 
override state regulatory policies.226  The Court thus drew a line with 
respect to the regulation of mergers: federal law would regulate disclosure 
quality, and state law would address substantive fairness.227 
The expansion of directors’ disclosure duties under Delaware state law 
encroaches upon the line articulated by the Court in Santa Fe.  Concededly, 
nothing in the Santa Fe decision or the federal securities laws precludes 
states from imposing disclosure duties in connection with mergers that 
supplement those imposed by federal law.228  But the broader message of 
Santa Fe is a message about the balance of power and the specialization of 
expertise.  Indeed, the Court in Santa Fe explicitly noted that the plaintiffs 
had an appraisal remedy available to them, which would have given them 
the opportunity to have the Chancery Court conduct a valuation of their 
stock, but that they had chosen not to pursue that remedy.229  By 
implication, the Court’s decision was based in part on the existence and 
perhaps superiority of state court as a forum for adjudicating claims about 
merger fairness.  Since Santa Fe, the Delaware Courts have developed 
considerable expertise in understanding and applying complex principles of 
 
221. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464–65 (1977). 
222. Id. at 467. 
223. Id. at 479–80. 
224. Id. at 475–76. 
225. Id. at 478. 
226. Id. at 478–79. 
227. See id. at 478–80. 
228. Indeed, the Exchange Act expressly preserves rights and remedies available under state 
law, leaving room for federal and state disclosure regimes to exist side by side.  See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)(2) (2012) (“[T]he rights and remedies 
provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist 
at law or in equity.”).  But see 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (preempting state court litigation for 
“covered class actions”). 
229. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 466–67. 
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valuation,230 as well as in analyzing the procedures by which mergers and 
other control transactions are conducted and negotiated.231 
In contrast, the federal courts have developed expertise both in 
evaluating disclosure quality and in evaluating the quality of litigation 
challenging that disclosure.  This expertise is enhanced within the subject of 
merger disclosure because the substantive content of a proxy statement in 
connection with a shareholder vote on a merger is largely determined by the 
SEC’s disclosure requirements.  Thus the federal courts’ analyses of 
disclosure challenges are informed by the choices that the SEC has made in 
formulating affirmative disclosure requirements and balancing those 
requirements against competing values.  This makes the federal courts 
particularly well-suited to evaluate the extent to which supplemental 
disclosures add material value to the information provided in a specific 
proxy statement. 
We argue here that the Delaware courts should follow a similar 
approach to that taken by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe and restore the 
conceptual boundary between state and federal regulation.  We propose that 
the courts conclude that claims about the adequacy of merger disclosure 
should be litigated under federal law (and subject to the materiality 
threshold established therein), leaving state law to focus on the fairness, 
both procedural and substantive, of the merger terms. 
Our proposal locates merger litigation within the space in which 
federal and state law potentially overlap and in which both Wilmington and 
Washington should consider the possibility of upsetting a “well-tuned 
balance” through greater regulatory intervention.232  Federal and state law 
take very different approaches to the regulation of mergers and, in the same 
manner that the Supreme Court has recognized the superiority of state 
mechanisms for evaluating substantive merger fairness, state courts might 
do well to rethink the intrusion into disclosure duties. 
IV. Objections and Responses 
A.  Multiforum Litigation 
The core objection to our proposal may be that the hands of the 
Delaware courts are tied.  While they might prefer to refuse to award 
attorneys’ fees in disclosure-only settlements, they face a real risk that, in 
doing so, they will drive merger litigation outside of Delaware and into 
 
230. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 
1305745, at *12–28 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). 
231. See, e.g., Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1239, 1244–49 (Del. 2012). 
232. Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
1, 16 (2009). 
FISCHETAL.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2015  6:24 PM 
2015] Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement 605 
other states in which the judges subject proposed settlements to lower levels 
of scrutiny.233  Recall that not only has the percentage of mergers facing a 
litigation challenge risen, but that mergers today typically face multiple 
litigation challenges in different fora.  If Delaware courts do not pay 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, they will file and settle their cases elsewhere.234  Indeed 
there is evidence that litigants have done precisely that, engaging in forum 
shopping and then, on occasion, entering into reverse auctions in which 
they agree to settle cases for limited value as long as they receive a fee 
award.235 
While it may be that forum shopping has thus far limited the ability of 
Delaware to reduce the volume of low-value merger litigation, since the 
judicial acceptance of forum-selection bylaws, however, the problems 
associated with multiforum litigation have entered a new phase.236  Forum-
selection bylaws allow a corporation to select, in advance, Delaware court 
as the exclusive forum for corporate governance disputes.237  The bylaws 
are expressly intended to apply to merger litigation.238  Hence, a corporation 
can effectively opt in to the Delaware approach to merger litigation by 
adopting a forum-selection bylaw, and, provided that the out-of-state court 
likewise defers to the bylaw provision, Delaware law will be applied by 
Delaware courts.239 
 
233. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 605, 634 (2012) (suggesting that courts in other states will scrutinize proposed settlements 
and fee awards less carefully); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 484–85 (discussing problems 
presented by multijurisdictional litigation).  
234. See John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1370–72 (2012) 
(explaining that Delaware’s historical approach to attorneys’ fees has been “widely believed to be 
more generous” but that fee cuts could lead to more out-of-Delaware litigation); Cain & Davidoff, 
supra note 4, at 496 (“[S]tate courts compete for litigation and attorneys respond rationally to the 
incentives provided by settlements . . . , and . . . fee awards themselves.”); Griffith & Lahav, supra 
note 15, at 1066–70 (examining a trend of cases moving out of Delaware). 
235. See Brief of Special Counsel, supra note 79, at 7 (discussing the danger that counsel will 
settle for too low an amount in order to secure a fee in a reverse auction situation); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370, 
1372–73 (1995) (explaining how forum shopping can lead to reverse auctions). 
236. See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 942, 963 
(Del. Ch. 2013) (concluding that such bylaws were facially valid under the statute as applied to 
cases arising under the internal affairs doctrine). 
237. See id. at 951–52 (explaining that forum-selection bylaws regulate where stockholders 
may file suit). 
238. Id. 
239. Cf. City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., No. 9795-CB, 2014 WL 
4409816, at *1, *5, *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2014) (deferring to a forum-selection bylaw in favor of 
North Carolina).  But see Roberts v. Triquint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402–02441, slip op. at 9 
(Ore. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014) (refusing to defer to forum-selection bylaw in favor of Delaware). 
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We note that we do not, in this Article, address the question of whether 
or to what extent courts should defer to forum-selection clauses.240  
Nonetheless, to the extent that courts accept such clauses, they enable our 
proposed rule to operate as a form of private ordering.  Were our proposal 
to be enacted, shareholders of corporations that adopted forum-selection 
bylaws would effectively be opting into a rule that barred the funding of 
disclosure settlements from the corporate treasury.  By contrast, 
shareholders of corporations that did not adopt forum-selection bylaws 
would effectively be electing to keep open the possibility of paying for a 
disclosure settlement in an alternative jurisdiction.241  Were Delaware to 
choose the clear rule we propose over its current haphazard approach, 
shareholders could decide for themselves, via the mechanics of forum-
selection clauses, which rule was optimal for them. 
Notably, even if other states do not uniformly defer to forum-selection 
provisions,242 the cases that our proposal would exclude from the Delaware 
courts are the weakest243—those in which the Delaware courts have the 
least interest in channeling deal makers’ conduct by critiquing the actions of 
the parties who are brought before them.244  As some commentators have 
observed, these critiques and exhortations are as vital to the development of 
Delaware law as the holdings themselves because they guide the conduct of 
transaction planners in future cases.245  We suggest, however, that the 
Delaware courts can perform these “teaching moments” most effectively 
not in the cases that settle for disclosures and small attorneys’ fee awards 
but rather those that, like El Paso and Del Monte, produce substantial 
 
240. See generally ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 2014) 
(suggesting deference in the context of a loser-pays bylaw). 
241. This assumes, of course, that the alternative jurisdiction does not itself have a rule 
barring the payment of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for disclosure settlements, an assumption that 
may not be warranted for every jurisdiction.  See infra notes 272–77. 
242. See supra note 239. 
243. The message courts appear to be sending in many of these disclosure-only cases is that 
the plaintiffs’ bar should stop bringing such weak cases.  See, e.g., In re PAETEC Holding Corp. 
S’holders Litig., No. 6761–VCG, 2013 WL 1110811, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2013) (stressing 
that close judicial scrutiny is warranted, especially “in the context of merger litigation that 
produces a disclosure-only settlement”).  The effect appears to be limited though given the 
continued high rate of litigation. 
244. A good recent example of such an opinion is In re El Paso Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 
in which Chancellor Strine declined to enjoin the merger but excoriated the conduct of the parties 
involved.  41 A.3d 432, 434–35 (Del. Ch. 2012).  Because the court did not issue an injunction, 
the opinion is technically all dicta, but the critique of the parties’ conduct gives transaction 
planners a clear sense of what to avoid in future deals. 
245. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1097–99 (1997) (remarking that shareholder litigation plays a 
beneficial role in the creation of corporate norms). 
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damage awards and attorneys’ fees.246  As a result, our proposal should not 
affect the pedagogical content of Delaware law in any meaningful way and 
instead sends a message to plaintiffs’ counsel to concentrate their efforts on 
the most problematic cases. 
An alternative to the use of forum-selection bylaws would be for the 
Delaware courts to adopt the restriction on attorneys’ fee awards in 
disclosure-only cases as a part of Delaware’s substantive corporate law.  As 
a substantive rule, this limitation would preclude other state or federal 
courts from awarding fees in these cases under Erie247 and the internal 
affairs doctrine.  We note that a substantive law approach would have the 
salutary effect of preserving the incentive for Delaware courts to continue 
their leadership role by maintaining the potential for competition with 
respect to the “good” merger cases. 
B. The Litigation Response to Barring Disclosure-Only Fee Awards 
We have focused in this Article on the incentive effect of settlement-
only fee awards.  We recognize, however, that our proposal creates an 
alternative set of incentives that may, in turn, impact future merger 
litigation.  Possible such effects include: (1) reducing merger litigation to 
the point that it allows bad deals to proceed unchallenged; (2) creating 
negative spillover effects in other forms of corporate litigation, such as 
appraisal actions; and (3) shifting to an alternative type of low value 
settlements in merger litigation.  We address each of these in turn. 
One challenge to our proposal is that it would undercut what is often 
seen as the basic value of merger litigation—that is, its ability to serve as a 
screen for deal quality.  According to this view, the real purpose of merger 
litigation is to identify and prevent bad deals from being consummated.  
However, because litigants cannot necessarily evaluate deal quality until the 
case gets into discovery—Del Monte is an example of a transaction that did 
not show its flaws until shareholder claimants reached discovery248—
merger litigation must be overinclusive at the filing stage in order to get 
potentially good cases into discovery.  Hence, the argument goes, our 
proposal inhibits the screening function of merger litigation because it is 
likely to result either in fewer claims being brought or in fewer claims being 
 
246. The settlement amount in El Paso was $110 million (with $26 million going to legal fees 
and expenses), while the settlement amount in Del Monte was $89.4 million (with $23.3 million 
going to legal fees and expenses).  El Paso, 2012 WL 6057331, at *para. 19; Stipulation and 
Agreement of Settlement at 10, El Paso, 41 A.3d 432 (No. 6949-CS); Del Monte Transcript, supra 
note 50, at 53, 58. 
247. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
248. See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(noting that “[d]iscovery revealed a deeper problem” with the sale process). 
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pursued with any real vigor.  Because fewer claims are being pursued, the 
screening function of merger litigation may not function optimally—that is, 
it may allow bad deals to proceed unchallenged. 
First, we acknowledge that our proposal is likely to lead to a reduction 
in merger litigation overall.  This is because the inability to win fees for 
disclosure settlements will reduce the profitability of merger litigation for 
plaintiffs’ firms on a portfolio basis, creating an incentive to curtail claims 
activity.  This is not necessarily a bad thing.  Indeed, in light of the ubiquity 
of litigation challenges to mergers, we view this as a virtue of our 
proposal.249  What we are advocating simply is a return to the state of 
merger litigation circa 2003 before the current litigation explosion.  In that 
year, 25 cases were brought or approximately 28.7% of deals using the 
same sample criteria that we use in this Article.250  We have little reason to 
believe that this level of litigation exposure was insufficient to deter 
misconduct. 
In addition, the Delaware courts can offset the effect of our proposal 
completely by simply paying higher attorneys’ fees for meritorious cases.  
Tailoring the fee award more closely to case quality would provide more 
appropriate incentives than paying counsel a nominal fee in every case, no 
matter how weak.  In contrast, current law seems to encourage plaintiffs’ 
firms to bring weak cases in the hope of winning fees for supplemental 
disclosures.  We would be happy if our proposal resulted in these claims not 
being brought. 
Moreover, a reduction in claims activity is problematic only if good 
claims and bad claims are equally deterred—in other words, that it is 
impossible to identify good and bad cases early in the process.  We doubt 
the accuracy of this proposition.  There are strong reasons to believe that 
plaintiffs’ firms are able to screen for case quality early in the litigation 
process and to expend their resources in the highest quality cases.  
Litigation experience under the federal securities laws subsequent to the 
adoption of the PSLRA strongly suggests both that plaintiffs’ lawyers 
respond to incentives and that, when the law structures incentives to reward 
only high quality cases, plaintiffs’ lawyers respond.251 
 
249. See supra Part III. 
250. This number is derived from unreported statistics used in our data compilation for 
another paper coauthored by one of the authors.  C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon & 
Randall S. Thomas, Zealous Advocates or Self-Interested Actors? Assessing the Value of 
Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 14-25, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2490098, 
archived at http://perma.cc/G26B-EMEX. 
251. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 622–23 (2007) (empirically testing the effect 
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Alternatively, a ban on fee awards in disclosure-only settlements might 
lead plaintiffs’ counsel to shift the nature of the cases they file.  One 
possibility is a shift from fiduciary duty claims to appraisal proceedings.  At 
least one empirical study has found that investors are making growing use 
of the appraisal remedy252 and, at least in some cases, recovering 
substantially more than the merger consideration.253 
To the extent our proposal generates a shift to appraisal proceedings, 
we would view that shift as an unmitigated benefit for two reasons.  First, 
the Delaware courts are experts in valuation methodology and continue to 
refine the appraisal proceeding to modernize the mechanism for 
shareholders to challenge merger price.  Second, appraisal focuses directly 
on the issue that is most central to a merger challenge—are shareholders 
receiving fair value for their stock?254  At the end of the day, whatever 
disclosure or process issues are involved, the primary issue from a 
shareholder perspective is the merger price.255  By focusing exclusively on 
that question, we view appraisal as the optimal method for providing 
shareholders with redress.  Indeed, as the Delaware courts have explained, 
the appraisal proceeding may provide shareholders with a better remedy 
than the standard fiduciary duty claim if the true concern is merger 
consideration because an appraisal proceeding requires a judicial 
determination of fair value, while a court will reject a fiduciary duty claim 
so long as the merger price is “within the range of fairness.”256  The 
difference is illustrated by the Cede & Co. v. Technicolor257 litigation, in 
which the court determined, in ruling on a breach of fiduciary duty claim, 
that the merger consideration of $23/share was fair,258 yet in an appraisal 
proceeding awarded the plaintiffs $28.41/share.259  Accordingly, we view 
the appraisal proceeding as creating appropriate litigation incentives for 
 
of PSLRA on filing decisions by plaintiffs’ attorneys and finding significant effect on the choice 
of cases filed). 
252. See Minor Myers & Charles R. Korsmo, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 14–18) (documenting a 
large increase in appraisal activity), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424935. 
253. See id. (manuscript at 36 tbl.3) (showing the mean amount allocated to shareholder to be 
much greater with “all appraisal” than with “no appraisal”). 
254. Id. (manuscript at 1); see also In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 35 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (“The appraisal proceeding seeks a statutory determination of fair value . . . .”). 
255. See Trados, 73 A.3d at 78 (finding no breach of fiduciary duty where merger price was 
determined to be fair). 
256. Id. 
257. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005). 
258. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor III), 663 A.2d 1156, 1176–77 (Del. 
1995). 
259. Cede, 884 A.2d at 30. 
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both shareholders and their counsel to bring challenges if and only if they 
have a reasonable chance of recovering additional consideration. 
A third possible concern is that our proposal eliminates only one 
pathway to wasteful settlement while leaving several others, notably 
amendment settlements and securities claims, completely unaffected.  The 
predictable result of this change, then, is that litigants with weak claims will 
seek to channel their rent-seeking efforts along these other paths, seeking 
fees in exchange for meaningless amendments to the merger agreement or, 
alternatively, seeking to conclude a meaningless disclosure settlement of 
their securities claim. 
Our first response is that we should not allow the perfect to become the 
enemy of the good.  If disclosure-only settlements do not benefit 
shareholders, they should not be incentivized.  This conclusion holds 
regardless if our proposal does not, at the same time, eliminate other 
opportunities for rent-seeking by plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Our second response 
is to question the extent to which these alternatives provide effective 
substitutes for disclosure-only settlements.  We have reasons to think they 
do not. 
At first glance, amendment settlements seem to be the most promising 
alternative pathway for plaintiffs’ lawyers’ rent-seeking efforts.  It may be 
possible for plaintiffs’ lawyers to negotiate very small modifications to the 
merger agreement and then to argue that these modifications benefit the 
shareholder class.  Indeed, this happens today.  Studies find that many 
common merger-agreement amendments involve modest changes to deal 
protections, such as a slightly longer go-shop period or a slightly smaller 
termination fee, generally with no observable effect, such as the subsequent 
appearance of an intervening bidder.260  Such changes might become more 
common were our proposal to be implemented.  Moreover, to prevent such 
amendments from disturbing their bargain, transacting parties could 
anticipate them in the terms of the original agreement by agreeing to a 
shorter go-shop period or a higher termination fee at the outset. 
While some such behavior may take place, we believe it is generally 
far less easy to settle for an amendment to the merger agreement than to 
settle for supplemental disclosures.  Our empirical results clearly support 
this view—in our sample, 13.60% of settlements are amendment 
settlements while 80.10% are disclosure-only settlements.  One explanation 
is that before plaintiffs’ lawyers and the target company can agree to amend 
the merger agreement, they must get the approval of a significant party at 
interest—namely, the acquiring company.  By this point in the process, the 
 
260. See RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, supra note 37, at 10 
(listing termination fees as a common amendment); Cain & Davidoff, supra note 4, at 479 (same). 
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acquiring company will have invested considerable effort and expense in 
the merger agreement and, having achieved agreement, will likely be loath 
to alter it.  In addition, even if the amendments are minor, the acquiring 
party arguably has something meaningful to lose from them, leading the 
settlement negotiation to be more adversarial in nature.  Simply put, the 
involvement of a third party with something to lose in the transaction 
inhibits collusion between the plaintiffs’ attorney and the defendant.261  In 
contrast, the negotiation of a disclosure settlement involves only the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers and the target corporation, enabling low-value 
disclosures to be traded more freely.262 
Furthermore, should the involvement of the counterparty to the merger 
agreement not be sufficient to prevent litigants from concluding low-value 
amendment settlements, the Delaware courts could once again become 
involved.  Chancery Court judges have a comparative advantage in 
evaluating merger agreements generally and deal-protection provisions in 
particular.  There is a large and well-developed body of substantive 
jurisprudence on the gamut of deal-protection devices—from poison pills 
and crown-jewel lockups to termination fees and no-talk or no-shop 
provisions.263  The judges of the Chancery Court regularly evaluate how a 
given provision affected a particular deal and would be especially well-
suited to determine whether a given amendment produced substantial 
benefit to the shareholder class.264 
The other obvious litigation alternative is for plaintiffs’ lawyers to file 
disclosure claims under the federal securities laws and to resolve those 
claims through disclosure-only settlements.  As noted earlier, we do not 
view this alternative as problematic, largely because of the existing body of 
procedural and substantive requirements designed to limit the potential for 
 
261. The acquiring company is unlikely to go along with whatever the target company and the 
shareholders’ lawyers suggest, potentially viewing the suggested amendments as negotiating 
gambits and insisting instead upon the deal as agreed. 
262. It is true that insofar as the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees are paid by directors and officers 
(D&O) insurance, as indeed they typically are, there is theoretically a third party at the table—
namely, the D&O insurers—who could constrain the ability of plaintiffs and defendants to 
collude, much as the acquiring company would constrain the parties in the context of an 
amendment settlement.  That the D&O insurer frequently does not live up to this role, however, is 
well documented.  See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: 
HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 138–41 (2010) (discussing 
the constraints on D&O insurers’ authority and influence over settlements). 
263. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 933–36 (Del. 2003) 
(evaluating multiple deal-protection devices); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (analyzing the use of a lock-up agreement). 
264. See, e.g., In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6084–VCL, 2011 WL 
6382523, at *18–26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011) (evaluating the benefit conferred to shareholders by 
modification of the deal protections in a merger agreement). 
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frivolous litigation.265  Substantively, a federal cause of action is more 
limited than a state law duty-of-disclosure claim, both because of the 
threshold materiality analysis and because of the fact that omissions are 
actionable only in the context of an affirmative duty to disclose.  As we 
have noted, federal courts have developed expertise in the application of 
these legal standards.266  Procedurally, the pleading standard of the PSLRA 
requires plaintiffs to identify specific misstatements and omissions at the 
outset rather than filing a boilerplate claim of inadequate disclosure, and the 
discovery stay prohibits plaintiffs from using the cost of discovery as 
leverage to induce a settlement.267  Studies suggest that the federal courts 
have been diligent in applying these standards to dismiss weak disclosure 
claims at an early stage.268 
V. A Roadmap to Implementation 
Having laid out our proposal, we briefly consider possible methods of 
implementation.  Because of Delaware’s leadership role in corporate 
litigation, and because of the high percentage of merger targets that are 
incorporated in Delaware, we look to Delaware to set the standard.  We 
believe that the likely proliferation of forum-selection bylaws will enhance 
Delaware’s ability to do so.  We note, however, that our proposal is 
available to other states and, indeed, that the state of Texas has adopted an 
approach that is analogous to what we suggest, albeit not focused 
specifically on the context of merger litigation.269 
Perhaps the most straightforward approach for eliminating fee awards 
in disclosure-only settlements would be for courts to stop recognizing 
disclosure-only settlements as producing a shareholder benefit sufficient to 
entitle plaintiffs’ lawyers to a fee award.  Because the corporate benefit 
doctrine is a judicially created doctrine,270 courts could implement this 
change themselves.  We note that some Delaware judges seem to be moving 
in this direction on a case-specific basis.  However, we recognize that 
judges are accustomed to applying discretion on a case-by-case basis and 
generally prefer rules that preserve rather than restrict their discretion.  As a 
 
265. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.  
266. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.  
267. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.  
268. See, e.g., Michael Klausner et al., When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When 
Do They Settle, and for How Much?—An Update, PLUS J., Apr. 2013, at 1, 8 (reporting, based on 
a study of all securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010, that “38% of cases ended 
relatively quickly and painlessly for the defendants”). 
269. See infra notes 272–76 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
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result, the courts may be unwilling to adopt a per se rule that binds their 
own hands.271 
An alternative would be for the courts, again as a matter of common 
law, to cut back on the breadth of the substantive duty of disclosure.  As we 
noted earlier, the Delaware duty of disclosure is of relatively recent origin, 
arguably broader than the federal law course of action, and somewhat 
imperfectly articulated because of the procedural context in which it is most 
frequently applied.  We suspect that the emergence of the duty of disclosure 
and the articulation by several courts of broad disclosure obligations, 
particularly with respect to the work and incentives of investment bankers 
in connection with control transactions, has contributed to the proliferation 
of merger litigation, especially because, under the existing obligation, 
disclosure challenges cannot readily be resolved on a motion to dismiss.  A 
substantive change to Delaware fiduciary duty law is a more ambitious 
response than our proposal requires, but it would be an effective solution as 
well.  Notably, a modification to the substantive duty of disclosure would 
reduce the ability of plaintiffs to evade the change through forum shopping. 
A third option would be for the Delaware legislature to adopt our 
proposed solution.  The most straightforward mechanism would be a statute 
that bars the award of attorneys’ fees in disclosure-only settlements of 
merger litigation.  As an example of such an action, the Texas Legislature 
recently instructed the Texas Supreme Court to amend the rules of civil 
procedure to prohibit the award of cash attorneys’ fees in class actions that 
are settled for coupons or other nonpecuniary benefits, a rule that goes 
farther than our own proposal.272  A recent decision of the Texas Court of 
Appeals, Kazman,273 held that this provision precluded the trial court from 
awarding monetary fees to class counsel in connection with a proposed 
disclosure-only merger settlement.274 
An important distinction between the Texas provision and our proposal 
is that the Texas legislation is not confined to merger cases.275  The 
motivation for the Texas law was a concern about coupon settlements in 
 
271. On the other hand, members of the Chancery Court might be relieved not to have to 
wade into the morass of fee disputes for what is now a large category of cases.  See Daniel Fisher, 
Delaware Judge Strine: ‘I’m Not Going to Give Big Fees for Junk,’ FORBES (Oct. 24, 2012, 
3:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/10/24/delaware-judge-strine-im-not-
going-to-give-big-fees-for-junk/, archived at http://perma.cc/F3KQ-P739 (quoting Chancellor 
Strine as stating “I’m not going to give big fees for junk” and that “[w]hat does trouble me is the 
hundreds and hundreds of lawsuits where the only beneficiary is the trial lawyer”). 
272. Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1.01, secs. 26.001–.002, 2003 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 847, 847–48 (codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 26.001–.003 (West 2014)). 
273. Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, 
no pet.). 
274. Id. at 387. 
275. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001–.003 (West 2014). 
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class litigation generally.276  This concern has been raised in other 
substantive contexts such as consumer and antitrust class actions.277  Yet 
from a political-economy perspective, enacting merger-specific legislation 
is a logical approach for Delaware given its interests in protecting target 
corporations incorporated within the state from unfounded and excessive 
litigation challenges.278  Delaware also benefits by removing unnecessary 
obstacles to the merger of Delaware corporations because such an action 
increases the expected value of corporations incorporated in the state.279 
A deeper question occasioned by our proposal is whether Delaware 
will willingly cede some of the authority it now possesses in merger 
regulation to federal courts.  Our proposal would have the effect of making 
federal courts, rather than Delaware, the central authority for evaluating the 
quality of disclosures in public company mergers.280  Ceding this role 
would go against the state’s seeming incentive to maximize its authority 
over businesses incorporated within the state.281  We argue that our 
empirical findings provide convincing evidence that the power conferred on 
the Delaware courts by ubiquitous and weak merger litigation challenges is 
illusory.  The cases resolved through disclosure-only settlements do not 
 
276. See Michael Northrup, Restrictions on Class-Action Attorney-Fee Awards, 46 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 953, 961 (2005) (“The adoption of the coupon rule evidences the legislature’s dissatisfaction 
with the practice of leveraging the class-action device into settlements that provide insignificant 
recoveries (or effectively no recovery) to class members, while the class attorneys recover large 
cash awards.”). 
277. James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443, 1445–47 (2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1172(d) (2012) (barring coupon 
settlements without court approval). 
278. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 8–9 (1993) 
(describing political-economy reasons for the Delaware legislature’s responsiveness to corporate 
interests).  Delaware derived $534,236,586 in revenue in 2008 from fees paid by corporations and 
other business associations.  Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 
136 tbl.3 (2009). 
279. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 
527–28 (2001) (hypothesizing that the value of Delaware firms reflect, in part, their amenability to 
a takeover under a balanced regulatory regime). 
280. This would encompass a reallocation of authority to the federal government after a long 
period of acquiescence.  Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover 
Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 211, 269 (2007). 
281. See Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic 
Judicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 505–06 (2012) (positing that Airgas 
provides insight into how Delaware courts seek to maximize Delaware’s dominance); Sean J. 
Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 
55 DUKE L.J. 1, 55 (2005) (recognizing the direct threat, imposed by the possibility of corporate 
migration, to Delaware’s revenue as a likely reason for the legislature’s responsiveness to 
corporate suggestion); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making 
Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 714–15 
(2009) (noting Delaware’s immense financial success as a result of its control of corporate 
lawmaking). 
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provide the Delaware courts with a meaningful role in implementing merger 
standards.  Freeing the courts from these cases would empower the courts to 
do what they do best—deciding real cases and setting substantive and 
procedural standards that matter from the perspective of business practices 
and shareholder value. 
Conclusion 
We have examined the value of nonpecuniary relief in merger 
litigation from a heretofore neglected angle—its effect on shareholder 
voting.  We find that amendment settlements have some demonstrable 
effect on shareholder voting but that disclosure-only settlements do not.  
The clear implication of these findings is that disclosure-only settlements 
do not produce a corporate benefit. 
Because disclosure-only settlements produce costs but no benefits, we 
argue that they should be eliminated.  An easy way to accomplish this is 
removing the judicially created incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring 
these cases by rejecting the claim that a disclosure-only settlement is a 
corporate benefit for purposes of Delaware law.  This approach would not 
leave shareholders without recourse if merger disclosures are materially 
deficient; instead they would be required to litigate true disclosure claims 
under the federal securities laws, preserving state merger litigation for 
challenges to the substantive and procedural fairness of the merger terms.  
The effect of adopting this policy would be to eliminate much wasteful 
litigation while still preserving the ability of Delaware courts to decide 
more substantial challenges to deals. 
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Appendix 
Table III (All Variables) 
Table III reports ordinary least squares regressions in which the 
dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is % Yes Votes Per Votes Cast; 
columns (3) and (4) is % Yes Votes Per Outstanding Shares; and columns 
(5) and (6) are % Yes Votes Per All Yes & No Votes.  % Yes Votes Per Votes 
Cast is the percentage of yes votes out of all votes cast at the meeting, 
including abstentions.  % Yes Votes Per Outstanding Shares is the 
percentage of yes votes out of the total outstanding voting shares of the 
target and eligible to vote as of the record date for the meeting.  % Yes 
Votes Per All Yes & No Votes is the percentage of yes votes out of the total 
number of yes and no votes cast at the meeting.  The sample is as described 
in subpart II(A), infra.  Initial Offer Premium is the initial offer price over 
target’s trading price thirty days prior to merger announcement.  Final Offer 
Premium is the final price paid over target’s trading price thirty days prior 
to announcement.  Cash indicates the consideration paid is all cash, Auction 
indicates the transaction is initiated as an auction among multiple bidders 
instead of a privately-negotiated sale, Go shop indicates that the merger 
agreement includes a provision that allows the target company to actively 
solicit other potential bidders for a specific limited period of time after the 
merger agreement has been signed, Take Private indicates that a Schedule 
13E-3 has been filed with the SEC for the transaction due to the buyer 
being an affiliated party.  ISS Position = 0 means ISS recommended that its’ 
client shareholders do not vote or vote against the transactions.  ISS 
Position = 1 means that ISS recommended that its client shareholders vote 
for the transaction. Appraisal Exercise = 1 if any shareholder exercised 
appraisal rights and = 0 otherwise.  Disclosure Settlement requires the target 
to make an additional disclosure concerning the transaction; Consideration-
Increase Settlement provides for an increase in the consideration payable to 
target shareholders; and Amendment Settlement requires the terms of the 
transaction to be revised.  Amendment Settlement also includes settlements 
that have as a component a Disclosure Settlement.  Consideration-Increase 
Settlement also includes settlements that have as a component Amendment 
or Disclosure Settlements.  Supermajority State = 1 if the state of 
incorporation of the target requires greater than 50% of shareholders to 
approve a merger and = 0 otherwise.  P-values are in parentheses, with ***, 
**, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  The models in columns (1), (3), and (5) include only targets 
incorporated in Delaware and where the acquisition is all cash.  All models 
include year-fixed effects.  P-values are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * 
denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table IV (All Variables) 
Table IV reports ordinary least squares regressions in which the 
dependent variable in columns (1) & (2) is % Yes Votes Per Votes Cast; 
columns (3) and (4) is % Yes Votes Per Outstanding Shares; and columns 
(5) and (6) are % Yes Votes Per All Yes & No Votes.  % Yes Votes Per Votes 
Cast is the percentage of yes votes out of all votes cast at the meeting, 
including abstentions.  Attorneys Fee > 500 is coded = 1 if the attorneys’ 
fees awarded in the litigation are greater than $500,000 and = 0 if the 
attorneys’ fees awarded are less than $500,000.  Attorney Fees (Log) is the 
log value of the attorneys’ fees awarded in the settlement.  All other 
variables are as defined in Table III(A).  All models include year-fixed 
effects.  P-values are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table V (All Variables) 
Table V reports ordinary least squares regressions in which the 
dependent variable in columns (1) & (2) is % Yes Votes Per Votes Cast; 
columns (3) and (4) is % Yes Votes Per Outstanding Shares; and columns 
(5) & (6) are % Yes Votes Per All Yes & No Votes.  % Yes Votes Per Votes 
Cast is the percentage of yes votes out of all votes cast at the meeting, 
including abstentions.  Columns (1)–(4) include all transactions in the 
sample, and columns (5) and (6) include only mergers with a transaction 
value less than $500 million.  Institutional Ownership % is the percentage 
of total institutional ownership.  Top 5 Institutional Ownership is the 
percentage ownership of the largest five institutional owners.  Top 10 
Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the largest ten 
institutional owners.  Maximum Institutional Ownership is the percentage 
ownership of the largest institutional owner.  Institutional ownership for 
each of these variables is as of the quarter end immediately prior to the 
shareholder meeting date.  All other variables are as defined in Table III(A).  
All models include year-fixed effects.  P-values are in parentheses, with 
***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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